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INTRODUCTION

The Internal Revenue Code requires that "the amount of any deduction . . . . shall be taken for the taxable year which is the proper taxable year under
the method of accounting used in computing taxable income." 1 Despite its
importance to the tax system, determination of the "proper taxable year," under
either an accrual method or the cash receipts and disbursements method of
accounting/ has been an uncertain exercise. Inconsistent judicial decisions3 and
conflicting positions of the Internal Revenue Service4 have failed to produce
clear guidelines for taxpayers to follow. Prompted by the perception that taxpayers had been successful in accelerating the timing" or overstating the amount"
of deductions, Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1984, which substantially
modified the principles governing the determination of the "proper taxable
year."
This article examines the tax treatment of future liabilities by accrual-basis
taxpayers. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1984, future liabilities often generated

1. I.R.C. § 461(a) (1982).
2. Section 446 of the Internal Revenue Code generally requires a taxpayer to compute taxable
income under the same method of accounting that he regularly uses for financial accounting pur·
poses. "Method of accounting," for this purpose, includes overall methods of accounting such as
the cash receipts and disbursements method, an accrual method, some combination of the two, or
the other methods permitted by Treas. Reg. S 1.446-1(c) (CCH 1985). It also includes the ac·
counting treatment of particular items, such as research and experimental expenditures or depre·
ciation. I.R.C. § 446(c) .(1982~; Treas. Reg. ~ 1.446-l(a)(l) (CCH 1985).
3. &e 4 B. BITTKER, fEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATES AND GIFTS ,, 105.2.5, 105.3.5,
105.3.6 (1981); Aidinoff & Lopata, Section 461 and Accrual-Method Taxpayers: The Treatment of Liabilities
Arising from Obligations to be Performed in the Future, 33 TAX LAW. 789, 790-95 (!980).
4. The Service's positions conllicted with judicial authority. &e, e.g., Ohio River Collieries
Co. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1369 (1981) (rejecting Service's view on accrual of mining reclamation obligation); Aidinoff & Lopata, supra note 3, at 796. Sometimes the positions were internally
inconsistent. See infra notes 33·34 and accompanying text.
5. See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Gong., 2d Sess. 1254 (1984); STAFF OF SgNATE FINANCE
CoMM., 98TH GoNG., 2n SEss., DEFICIT REDtiCTION TAx BtLL oF 1984 ExPLANATION oF PRoviSIONs
APPROVED l.lY THE COMMITTEE ON MARCH 21, 1984, at 271, 274 (Comm, Print) (hereinafter cited
as SENATE CoMMITTEE REPORTj; STAFF OF jOINT CoMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 98TH GoNG., 2D SESs.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENtiE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDtiCTION AcT OF 19.84, at
260 (Comm. Print) [hereinafter cited as JOINT CoMMITTEE REPORT].
6. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 5, at 1254; SENATE CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5,
at 271; jOINT CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 260.
7. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 and the Spending Reduction Act of 1984 make up the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494.
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''premature afcruals. '' 8 Deductions were sometimes allowed when liabilities were
accrued rather than when they were satisfied. Premature accruals provided enor·
mous economic benefits to a taxpayerq because, under the governing "all events"
test, 10 the time value of money' 1 was not a factor in determining the timing
and the amount of any deductions. To remedy this abuse, the Tax Reform
Act provided, in general, that liabilities are deductible' 2 no earlier than "eco·
nomic performance,'' the time when activities are performed that satisfy the
liability. t:l

8. The term "premature accrual" is used throughout the legislative history of the Tax
Reform Act but without explicit definition. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
871, reprinted in 1984 U.S. ConE CoNe. & Ao. NEWS 1445, 1559 [hereinafter cited as CoNFERENCE
CoMMITTEE REPORTJ; H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 5, at 1252; SENATE CoMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 264; jorNT CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 258.
9. See infra notes 26-40 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 49-138 and accompanying text.
II. The tax literature on the "time value of money" has become voluminous. For a sample
of recent discussions of potential abuses arising from failure to take the time value of money into
account, see Aidinoff & Lopata, supra note 3; Canellos & Kleinbard, The Miracle of Compound Interest:
Interest Diferral and Discount after 1982, 38 TAX L. REv. 565 (!982); Cliff & Levine, Interest Accrual
and the Tinu Value of Monry, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 107, 109-10 (1984); Committee on Taxation of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Transactions Involving Diferred Paynunt of Accrued
Liabilities: Federal Income Tax and the Time Value of Money, 38 R£c. A.B. CITY N.Y. 555 (1983),
reprinted in 20 TAx NoTES (TAx ANALYSTs) 699, 711 (Aug. 29, 1983) [hereinafter cited as New
York City Bar Report, with page citations to the reprint in TAx NOTES]; Ferencz, A Review of
Tax Planning Techniques fM Mismatching Income and Expenses, 61 TAXES 829 (1983); Gunn, Matching
of Casts and Revenues as a Goal of Tax Accounting, 4 VA. TAX REv. I (1984); Halperin, The Time
Value of Monry
1984, 23 TAx NoTES (TAx ANALYSTs) 751 (May 14,. 1984); Note, Protecting the
Public Fisc: Fighting Accrual Abuse with Section 446 Discretion, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 378, 382-87 (1983).
See also J. EusTICE, THE TAx REFORM AcT OF 1984: A SELECTIVE ANALYSIS, ch. 2 (1984).
12. For accrual-method taxpayers the changes made by the Tax Reform Act are generally
effective for deductions that, under prior law, would have been allowable after July 18, 1984 (the
date of enactment of Tax Reform Act of 1984). Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 9l(g)(J), 98 Stat. at 608;
Temp. Reg. § 1.461-3T Q&A-1, reprinted in [1986] 5 FED. TAXES (P-H) '20,555, at 20,590. The
taxpayer may elect, however, to apply the new rules as of the first day of the taxable year that
includes July 19, 1984. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, S 91(g)(2), 98 Stat. at
608; Temp. Reg. § 1.461-3T Q&A-2 (1985), reprinted in [1986] 5 FEn. TAXES (P-H) , 20,555, at
20,590.
13. I.R.C. § 461(h)(2), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 91(a),
98 Stat. at 598-99. See irifra notes 198-213 and accompanying text. This article discusses the application of the "economic performance" test to accrual-basis taxpayers. The Act also extended
the "economic performance" requirement to those cash-basis taxpayers that fit the definition of
"tax shelter" under the Act. A tax shelter may deduct a prepaid expense no earlier than an
accrual-basis taxpayer would have been permitted to treat the expense as incurred. LR.C. ~ 46l(i)(l),
as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 9l(a), · 98 Stat at 600. These changes
affecting cash-basis taxpayers are generally effective for deductions claimed after March 31, 1984.
Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 91(g)(1)(B), 98 Stat. at 608.
An enterprise (other than a C corporation) is a "tax shelter" if
(I) at any time interests in the enterprise have been offered for sale in an offering
required to be registered with any state or federal agency;
(2) more than 35 percent of the losses of the enterprise are allocable to limited investors
(such as limited partners) who do not actively participate in management; or
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The term "economic performance" is new, but the concept is not. The
Internal Revenue Service had taken the view that a performance requirement
was implicit in prior law. 14 Yet, partly because the Commissioner did not ar·
ticulate an economic justification for his position, the Service's view was not
universally accepted by the courts. 15 Had the Commissioner stressed the time
value of money, he would probably have been far more successful in his challenges of premature accruals. Hi
The codification of the economic performance requirement, although imperfectly based on time value of money concepts, introduces a measure of
economic sophistication into the deduction guidelines. The practical effect is to
delay many deductions, thereby reducing the number of premature accruals and
enhancing tax revenues. 17 The changes have the additional salutary theoretical
effect of interring both the "matching principle"'a and, more generally, the
idea of a congruence between tax and financial accounting. Conformity to financial accounting concepts, including the matching principle, has never
been a controlling principle in tax law, 19 but it has had an intuitive ap-

(3) the principal purpose of the enterprise is the avoidance or evasion of income tax.
l.R.C. S 46l(i)(3), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, S 91(a), 98 Stat.
at 601; ~ 1256(e)(3)(B) (CCH 1985); § 6661(b)(2)(C)(ii) (CCH 1985). "Tax shelter" is so broadly
defined, particularly in category (3) above, that the statute may apply to many cash-basis taxpayers
not ordinarily considered to be tax shelters. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-S(b) (CCH 1985)
(defining "tax shelter").
!4. See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases in which the Service
argued that deductibility could not precede the time that the taxpayer's liability was satisfied by
the performance of the obligation. The Service was not entirely consistent in imposing an economic
performance requirement, however. See Rev. Rul. 69-429, 1969-2 C.B. 108 (accrual-basis taxpayer
permitted to deduct, in year award determined by a commission, undiscounted amount of workers'
compensation award payable over several years), superseding I.T. 1263, I-1 C.B. 123 (1922) (to
same effect); McGown, Structured Settlements: Deduct Now and Pay Later, 60 TAXES 251, 257 (1982);
infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1369 (1981). See also infra
notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
16. See Gunn, supra note 11, at 31-32.
17, See Helfand & MacNeil, New Economic Performance Test Will Difer Many Deductions of AccrualBasis Taxpayers, 13 TAX'N FOR LAws. 110, 113 (1984}. For example, the Senate Finance Committee
estimated that its version of the provisions governing premature accruals would increase fiscal year
1984 budget receipts by $209 million. SENATE CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 269.
18. The matching principle requires that revenue and the cost of earning that revenue be
matched in the same taxable year. See Aidinoff & Lopata, supra note 3, at 796-98.
19. For example, taxpayers have generally not been permitted to deduct contingent liabilities,
see infra ·notes 57-95 and accompanying text, even if generally accepted financial accounting prin·
ciples, including the matching principle, would require accrual. See infra text accompanying notes
63-66. Accrual of contingent liabilities is required for financial ·reporting purposes in some cases
to prevent an overly optimistic picture of the business's financial situation. See infra notes 181-85
and accompanying text.
The matching of income and the costs of earning that income is not even a professed goal
for taxpayers using the cash receipts and disbursements method. See Malman, Treatment of Prepaid
In.come
Clear Riflection of Income or Muddied Waters, 37 TAx L. REv. 103, 105 (1981); Note, supra
note 11, at 381. Under the cash method, see infra text accompanying note 41, the timing of
deductions bears no necessary relationship to the timing of inclusion of income. Because of the
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The Tax Reform Act ended any
that
once may have had.
This article will first describe the
absurd economic results that
can arise with premature accruals. 21 The principles
deductibility
prior to the Tax Reform Act are evaluated with
on the "all events"
test, 22 the further requirement that a method of accounting "dearly reflect
2
" " and the relationship of the matching principle to the "clear reflection'' standard.
This article further considers the Tax Reform Act's response to the economic
inadequacies of prior law; the
while
the ali events test,
As
result, denow includes an express economic
ductions of accrual-basis taxpayers more
not
the proper economic results.

II.

THE PRoBLEM: PREMATURE AccRUALS AND THE TrME VALUE oF MoNEY

Prior to the Tax Reform Act of
taxpayers
an accrual method
of accounting were able to generate deductions for future liabilities that over·
stated the economic costs of those liabilities. ~ 6 The
between the de·
duction and the actual cost to the taxpayer arose because the
Internal
Revenue Code provisions did not recognize the time value of money. One
dollar of future costs could result in a current deduction of one
though the present value of that future
was
less, than one dollar.
An
excessive
a
rs
problem any time an accrual
payment of a future
its associated costs. "7 The
time between accrual and payment, the
greater the
economic benefit to the taxpayer. When a current deduction
is permitted and the amount of the future obligation is not
discounted to reflect the time
the taxpayer will realize the econom1c
benefit.
The
of its i 984 tax reform

cash method's inconsistency with generally accepted a<~coonting principles and its resultant fa.ilure
to measure "economic income," the Reagan administration has recommended severely restricting
the use of the cash method by taxpayers. THE PRESIDt,:<T's TAx PROPOSALS TO THE CoNGRESS FOR
FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND Sn.<PL!C!TV 213
1985) !hereinafter cited as 1985 REAGAN PROPOSALS],
20. See Schapiro, Tax Accounting jm
Iru:ome- and Reserves jor Future l£xpenses, 2 TAx REVISION
CoMPENDIUM l 133 (House Comm. on Ways and Means 1959). "The commercial accounting prac·
tices appear intuitively as producing a fairer and more accurate reflection of net income." I d. at
J 141 Schapiro did, however, reject that intuitive appeal in his article.
21. See infra notes 26-40 and accompanying text.
22. See irifra notes 49- H5 and acmmpanying text.
23. See infra notes 146-62 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes !63-90 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 191-256 and accompa11ying text.
26. The Tax Reform Act was not entirely successful in attacking this problem. See i~fra notes
233-42 and accompanying text.
27. See Gunn, supra note l1, at 35.
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provides an example of the time value of money principle in operation. 2a In
1983 A, an accrual-basis taxpayer, incurred a contractual obligation to pay $100
in 1990 for services to be performed in 1990. If A invested $58.35 in 1983 at
an eight percent after-tax rate of return, in 1990 he would have exactly the
$100 needed to satisfy the liability.
Viewed from A's perspective in 1983, the obligation can be described in
two ways: an obligation to pay an expense of $100 in 1990 or an obligation
to pay an expense that in 1983 has a present value of $58.35. For the deduction
to reflect the true economic cost, A should be limited to a deduction 29 of $58.35
in 1983, or a deduction of $100 in 1990. No theory grounded in economic
reality would permit A's premature accrual of the entire obligation and the
deduction of $100 in 1983. 10
Tax accounting rules have not been grounded in economic reality, however.
The deduction in 1983 was not limited to the present value of the future
obligation, and even the Internal Revenue Service did not advocate such a
position.:11 Moreover, if certain requirements were met/1 A could have deducted
the entire $100 in 1983. Although the Commissioner generally insisted that the
$100 deduction be deferred until the services under the contract were performed,:l'l his protestations at times went unheeded by judicial bodies.
In some cases, even though the economic benefits were conceptually identical
to those in the Treasury's example, the Commissioner did not even protest.
The possibilities for imaginative tax planning were particularly prevalent in cases
involving structured tort or workers' compensation settlements. Curiously, contrary to its general position, the Internal Revenue Service ruled in such cases
that, if the settlement was payable in fixed amounts over a number of years,
the total undiscounted amount of the future liability was deductible in the year
of the award. ·H
The following example reveals the absurdity that can result from an immediately deductible, undiscounted settlement award. Assume that business

28. Treasury Department. General ExplaiUltions rif Administration's Revenue Provisions in 1985 Budget,
71 STAN. FRD. TAX REP. (CCH) No. 10, pt. II, at 109 (extra ecl. Feb. 17, 1984).
29. This article discusses the particular problems of accruaL It is assumed that the expenses
at issue have a statutory basis for deduction, such as l.R.C. § 162, which generally permits
deductions for ordinary and necessary expenses of carrying on a trade or business, and the expenses
do not result in the creation of assets that have useful lives extending substantially beyond the end
of the taxable year. Treas. Reg, § L461-l(a)(2) (CCH !9B5). If such an asset is created, the
expense must be capitalized, and it is therefore not currently deductible. See I.R.C, § 263 (19B2).
30. Treasury Department, supra note 28, at 109. Any deduction greater than $58.35 in !983
would have been theoretically inappropriate, assuming that the discount rate used for determining
the present value was properly selected.
3l. Such a position, however, was advocated by Aidinoff & Lopata, supra note 3, at BlllB.
32. See infra notes 49·138 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 7B-87 and accompanying text.
34. Rev. RuL 69-429, 1969-2 C.B. 108. The ruling involved a self-insured partnership that
was obligated to pay an injured employee in installments over several years. The amounts were
fixed by the state Industrial Commission under the governing Workmen's Compensation Act. The
ruling is only four sentences long and contains no reasoning whatsoever.
35. McGown, supra note 14, at 252-53.
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taxpayer
subject to a fifty percent marginal tax rate, IS sued in a personal
injury action. Rather than settling for $1 million, payable currently, Z offers
to make a single $3 million payment in ten years. If currently deductible, the
$3 million liability can be quite beneficial to Z as well as to the claimant.
The future payment may be attractive to the injured party because the
payment's present value, under certain assumptions, is greater than $1 million. 36
From Z's standpoint, the potential benefits are astonishing. Z will save $1.5
million in taxes provided his income is sufficient to make full use of the deduction currently. If he invests the $1.5 million tax savings in tax-free bonds
with a te,n percent return, Z will have $3,890,614 in ten years, when the $3
million obligation must be fulfilled. Thus Z will be better off, after taxes,
because he was sued.:n As Professor Gunn noted, "If this is the law [prior to
the Tax Reform Act], well-advised accrual-method businesses should cancel their
liability insurance and run down pedestrians at the rate of at least one a year. ":m
Premature accruals do not ordinarily increase the after-tax income of an accrual-method taxpayer; the structured settlement example is unusual in that
respect. 39 Nevertheless, the example accurately portrays the nature of the economic benefit attributable to premature accruals. How could a result so patently
ridiculous"'J be given serious consideration by the Internal Revenue Service or
by a court? The next section of the article discusses the standards that governed
deductibility prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1984.

III.

STANDARDs FoR DEDUCTIBILITY BEFORE THE TAx REFORM AcT OF

1984:

THE ALL EvENTS TEsT AND THE CLEAR REFLECTION oF INcOME

Premature accruals resulted from the application of tax principles that had
no economic basis. Indeed, it is striking how limited a role economic analysis
played in the development of standards for deducting future liabilities. Prior to

36. McGown assumes that the claimant could secure an after-tax return of 10.8% (an 18%
investment return reduced by an effective tax rate of 40%) on his $1 million, leaving him with
$2,788,673 after 10 years. Id.
The desirability of the structured settlement to the claimant in a personal injury action is
enhanced by the Code's treatment of amounts received "on account of personal injuries or sickness."
No portion of such an award will be included in the claimant's income whether received as a lump
sum or as periodic payments. LR.C. § l04(a)(2) (1982). Thus, even though part of any payment
made in a later taxable year consists of economic interest, the Code does not require breaking out
the interest component and taxing it separately. See Cane, How to Use and Betujit from Structured
Settlements in Personal Injury Suits, 59 J. TAx'N 330, 331 (1983); McGown, supra note 14. at 252.
See also Ferencz, supra note 11, at 834 (arguing that structured settlements should be analyzed as
having two elements: (i) the damage liability and (ii) interest for the privilege of paying the liability
over time); Frolik, The Convergence of l.R.C. § 104(aX2), Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v, Licpelt
and Strll£/ured Tort Settlements.· Tax Policy "Derailed", 51 FoRDHAM L. REv. 565 (1983) (criticizing
exemption of "interest" component from income).
37. McGown, supra note 14, at 253.
38. Gunn, supra note 11, at 26.
39. See id. at 27 n.l16,
40. Gunn suggested:
[T]he absurdity of a rule that can make the tax benefit of a deduction exceed its cost is
so clear, once it has been noted, that the Government should have a fair chance of winning
future deferred·payment cases if it makes the right argument: that an immediate deduction
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1984, no direct attempt was made to correlate the amount and
deduction with the true cost of the liability to the taxpayer.
A.

{Vol. XXXVII

of a

Accrual Methods of Accounting: Introduction

and disbursements method of acFor taxpayers
the cash
amounts are included in income when
and expenses are not
deductible before payment!' In contrast, expenses may be reflected
an accrual method of
the time of incurrence 42 for a taxpayer
the time an expense is paid does not control the time of the

l(>r expenses paid in the distaht future distorts income. That the law should not be ··a
ass, a idiot" is a principle of some persuasive force,
ld.
31-32 (footnote omitted).
41. &e Trcas. Reg. § 1.451-l(a) (CCH 1985) (gains, profits, and income includible lor taxable
year in which cash-basis taxpayer actually or constructively receives such am.ounts); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.461-l(a)(l), T.D. 6520, 1961-l C.B, 52, 62-63 (amounts of allowable deductions taken into
account for taxable year in which paid); Treas. Reg.§ l.44:6-l(cXlJ{i)
191!5) (to same
42. "[T]he basic idea under [an] accrual system
accounting is that the books shall immediately reflect obligations and expenses definitely incurred and income definitely <~arned without
regard to whether payment has {yet] been made or whether payment is due." H.H. Brown Co.
Commissioner, 8 B.T.A 112, 17 (1927) (emphasis added), acq. VII-I C.B. 5.
Accrual principles have been described as follows:
( l} Revenues arc recognized as entering into the determination of income when sales are
made or services are rendered.
(2) The mere receipt of money or the promise of another person to pay money for goods
or services does not represent revenue which should be recognized in the period of
receipt if it is burdened with an obligation to deliver goods or render services in the
future. Items of this nature are treated as resulting in liabilities or deferred credits
until they are earned through the fulfillment of the required performances.
(3) Costs and expenses directly identifiable with revenues are chargeable against the income of the period in which the revenues are recognized. Expenses, such as insurance,
rent, property taxes and interest, which are for particular periods of time are chargeable over such periods. Other expenses incurred in the general conduct of the business
are chargeable against the income of the period in which they are incurred unless it
is clearly evident that they are for the benefit of future periods and there is a reasonable
basis, both as to amount and time, for allocating them to future periods, in which
event they should be deferred and charged to such periods.
( 4) If the precise amount of any costs or expenses is not deter·minable at the time they
are chargeable against income, they should be recognized on the basis of reasonable
estimates.
(5) Accounting recognition of costs and expenses which cannot be determined with a
reasonable degree of accuracy at the time they would othcnvise be charged against
income of a particular period should be deferred until such determination is possible.
Stang<~r, V andcr Kam, & Polilka, Prepaid Income and Estimated Expenses.' Financial Accounting Versus
Tax Acco~tnting Dichotomy, 33 TAx LAw. 403, 405 (1930).
43. The Code speciftcally permits use of ''an'' accrual method of accounting, while it refers
to "the" cash receipts and disbursements method. I.R,C. H 446(c)(1), 446(c)(2) (1982). The choice
of "an" has been interpreted as "a conscious effort on the part of Congress to permit considerable
" Diamond &
latitude within the realm of permissibility for taxpayers using the accrual
Hoiman, Accounting Methods
Definitions, Permissibility, TAx Mci\<T (BNA)
•t6-4-th, at A-l9
(1979).
In general, taxpayers thar are required to use inventories for a particular trade or business
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In addition, the time a payment 1s received does not determine the
time of inclusion in income. 44
The general principles behind accrual accounting do not, of course, define
the precise timing of a deduction for future liabilities. When is a deductible
definitely incurred for this purpose? Prior to the Tax Reform
application of the "all events test" provided a tentative answer. An additional
46
that the current deduction "clearly reflect income, "<i was also
available to the Commissioner to challenge the timing of deductions. The following subsections discuss the "all events test" and the "clear reflection" reAlthough their importance has declined, both standards survived the
made by the Tax Reform Act of 1984. 48

B.

The All Events Test

The all events test did not
m
It was first articulated
the United States
Court m United States v. Anderson,'" and was later

must use an accrual method of accounting for their purchases and sales. Treas. Reg. § l.446l(c)(2)(i) (CCH 1985). Inventories arc required in all cases in which the prnduction, purchase, or
sale of merchandise is an income producing factor. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1958). Service businesses
have generally not been required to use an accrual method of accounting, but President Reagan's
1985 tax reform proposals would require service businesses with annual gross receipts greater than
$5 million to use an accrual method. l9B5 REAGAN PROPOSALS, supra note 19, at 2B.
44. Although the time of receipt is ordinarily not controlling, payments received by an accrualbasis taxpayer before the amounts have, in fact, been earned generally must be included in income
at the time of receipt. This result follows even though it is inconsistent with generally accepted
financial accounting principles. Set Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963) (prepayments
for dancing lessons); American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 6B7 (1961) (prepayments
of membership dues); Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. !80 (1957) (prepayments of
membership dues). The results in this Supreme Court trilogy have been justified as reflecting "tax
income," which, a commentator suggests, "is intended to be an index of a taxpayer's current
ability to pay tax," rather than a measure of economic income. Note, supra note 11, at 403.
Some relief from the effects of the trilogy has been provided in the Code, the regulations,
and the Internal Revenue Service's own procedures. See I.R.C. § 455 (1982) (special rules for
prepaid subscription income); I.R.C. § 456 (1982) (special rules lor prepaid dues of certain mem··
bership organizations); Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(b), T.D. 7397, 1976·1 C.B. 115, 12.1-22 (generally
permitting income from sale of goods to be deferred until year of accrual under financial accounting
method if consistent method used for tax purposes); Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549 (one-year
deferral of inclusion permitted under certain circumstances). For a discussion of the prepayment
issue, see Malman, supra note 19.
4·5. See supra note 29.
46. Thus, "accrual analysis can be easily summarized: a taxpayer accounts for income and
expenses according to the all-events test unless special considerations, raised by the notion of 'clear
reflection of income,' require a different result." Gunn, supra note 11, at 4.
47. If the method of accounting used by a taxpayer (see supra note 2) "does not dearly reflect
income," the Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to require the reporting of taxable income
under a method that does clearly reflect income. l.R.C. § 446(b) (1982): Treas. Reg. § 1.446l(b)(l) (1957). See infra notes 146-90 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 249·51 and accompanying text, which discuss what remains of the two
requirements after the Tax Refor~ Act.
49. 269 U.S. 422 (1926). Anderson considered the timing of the deduction of a munitions tax
that was imposed on 1916 profits but was
paid in 1917. The taxpayer kept its books using
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incorporated, in a somewhat liberalized version, into the Income Tax Regulations:
Under an accrual method of accounting, an expense is deductible for
the taxable year in which all the events have occurred which determine
the fact of the liability and the amount thereof can be determined with
reasonable accuracy . . . . [T}he fact that the exact amount of the liability
which has been incurred cannot be determined will not prevent the accrual within the taxable year of such part thereof as can be computed
with reasonable accuracy. S<>
Thus, for pre-Tax Reform Act accruals, 5 ' a taxpayer had to demonstrate both
(i) that all events had occurred to insure that the taxpayer actually had an
obligation (the fact of the liability), and (ii) that the amount of the liability, while
not necessarily precisely fixed, had been reasonably computed.'' 2 The failure to
satisfy either requirement of the two-part test was "fatal" to a taxpayer's claim
for a current deduction. 53
The two-part test was not easily applied. 54 Neither of the parts generated
controlling principles acceptable to both the Internal Revenue Service and the

an accrual method and established reserves for such reasonably expected expenses. The test for
deductibility, as stated by Justice Stone, was whether "all the events [have occurred] which fix
the amount of the tax and determine the liability of the taxpayer to pay it." Id. at 441. Since
the 1916 munitions tax W<\S fixed by events occurring in 1916, the Supreme Court held that the
tax was properly deductible from gross income in 1916. !d.
Before enactment of the 1954 Code and the adoption of the regulations thereunder, the income
tax regulations did not expressly incorporate the all events test: an accrual-basis taxpayer was entitled
to a deduction for the taxable year in which a liability was "accrued" or "incurred," and the
Anderson principles were applied to determine the time of accrual or incurrence. See LTR 7831003,
IRS LETTER RuL. REPS. (CCH) No. 75, at 4 (Apr. 13, 1978) (technical advice memorandum).
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.46l·l(a)(2) (1957). See also Treas. Reg. S 1.446·1(c)(l)(ii), T.D. 7285,
1973·2 C.B. 16:1, 164.
A rule nearly identical to that in Treas. Reg. § 1.46l·l(a)(2) applies to the accrual of revenue:
"income is to be included for the taxable year when all the events have occurred which fix the
right to receive such income and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy."
Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)(l)(ii) (CCH 1985). See also Treas. Reg. S l.45f-l(a) (1957). This test too
can be traced to a Supreme Court decision:
Keeping accounts and making returns on the accrual basis, as distinguished from the cash
basis, import that it is the right to receive and not the actual receipt that det<,rmines the
inclusion of the amount in gross income. When the right to receive an amount becomes
fixed, the right accrues.
Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 184-85 (1934) (emphasis in original).
The Internal Revenue Service applies a similar test in determining whether a transferee of
property, who assumes liabilities of the transferor in the transaction, may include the estimated
cost of the unsatisfied liabilities in the basis of the property: "[N]o amount is to be included in
cost with respect to those obligations which are so contingent and indefinite that they are not
susceptible to present valuation, until such time as they become fixed and absolute and capable
of determination with reasonable accuracy." Rev. Rul. 55·675, 1955-2 G.B. 567, 568.
51. See sufJra note 12 (effective date of accrual provisions of Tax Reform Act of 1984).
52. See Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1369, 1372-73 (1981).
53. See id. at 1373; Southern Pac. Trans. Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497, 634 (1980).
54. Although taxpayers are often granted considerable leeway for purposes of income inclusion,
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judiciary. Indeed, the disagreement over the Treasury regulations was fundamental, involving potentially radical differences in the timing of deductions.
The proper timing of deductions is an economic issue. Because of the time
value of money, taxpayers usually seek to accelerate deductions"" and, in timehonored fashion, the Commissioner resists. Despite the economic motivation,
however, timing disputes between taxpayers and the Commissioner were not
resolved by the economic reasonableness of deferral or acceleration. The disputes
centered instead on formalistic analyses of the contingency and the accuracy of
the liability, factors that have little bearing on the economic wisdom of a deduction's timing.
1.

All Events Test Requirement I: Fact of the Liability

As a general proposition, a liability in fact exists if no contingencies are
present that could defeat the liability. For example, in Lucas v. American Code
Co.,"'' the taxpayer was not permitted to deduct the estimated amount of its
"strenuously contested" liability in a breach of contract suiL By its contest,
the taxpayer made the fact of the liability uncertain.''"
Similarly, in Brown v. Helvering, 60 an insurance agent's "obligation" to refund
a portion of his commissions upon the cancellation of any policies was held to
be contingent. Because it was not definite that any policy would be cancelled,

see Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)(l)(ii), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 G.B. 163, 164, application of the all events
test is not necessarily simple. Cf Gunn, supra note II, at 8-9, 28-30. In many areas involving
significant dollar amounts, application of the all events test to future liabilities has been crucial to
deductibility
for example, structured settlements, mining reclamation obligations, employer obligations under workers' compensation agreements, and employer contributions under supplemental
unemployment benefit plans. See New York City Bar Report, supra note 11, at 701-06.
55. See irifra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
56. A deduction of one dollar in the current taxable year is generally preferable to a deduction
of one dollar in a subsequent year, but there are exceptions to this general rule. For example,
deferring a deduction may be desirable if the taxpayer expects to be subject to a higher marginal
tax rate in later years.
57. Under the rulings of the Internal Revenue Service, the only contingency that may exist
if the all events test is to be satisfied is the obligor's ability to pay. See infra note 78 and accom·
panying text.
58. 280 U.S. 445 (1930).
59. ld. at 450-51. In addition, the amount of the damages was "wholly unpredictable,"
depending on such factors as the extent of the plaintiff's mitigation of damages. ld. at 451. See
also Consolidated Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 477 (1984), aff'd per curiam, 767 F.2d ·11
(2d Cir. 1985) (where state law uses federal taxable income as the tax base and taxpayer contests
federal liability, state tax liability is treated as contested and therefore not deductible until dispute
resolved); Webb Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 241 (1981) (liability contingent
where no admission of loss).
The Code itself now provides limited relief for contested liabilities. A contested liability may
be deducted by an accrual-method taxpayer prior to resolution if the liability would otherwise be
deductible and the taxpayer has actually paid the liability. l.R.C. § 461(f), as amended by Tax
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 9l(e), 98 Stat. at 607. If the liability has been paid,
there is no interval between accrual and payment and hence no premature accrual. But see infra
notes 237-40 and accompanying text (prepayment under TRA).
60. 291 U.S. 193 (1934).
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a refund obligation might never arise. Therefore the agent was not permitted
to deduct an estimate of future refunds. 61
The holding in Brown was predicated on the uncertainty of the future liability, not on the future nature of the obligation. Presumably, the result would
have been different if the agent had sought to deduct a future refund obligation
arising from a policy already cancelled. Assume, for example, that Brown became contractually obligated to refund a portion of the commissions for a policy
cancelled in 1984, but was not required to make the refund until 1986. Under
these circumstances, the fact of the obligation would have been fixed in 1984,
the year of the cancellation. 62 If the agent also demonstrated the amount of the
obligation, both prongs of the all events test would have been met, and thus
a deduction permitted, in 1984.
The proper role of generally accepted accounting principles in determining
the timing of deductions is a subject of controversy, but it is clear those principles are not ultimately controlling. Unless the Code expressly provides otherwise, 63 contingent liabilities cannot be deducted for tax purposes, even though
they must often be reflected in a taxpayer's financial accounts. In order for
potential investors and creditors to receive an accurate picture of a business's
financial health, 64 generally accepted accounting principles require that contingent obligations be reflected as expenses on the enterprise's financial statements. 65 Mandatory financial accounting treatment, however, does not necessarily
translate into required, or even permitted, tax accounting treatment.

61. ld. at 200-01. The Supreme Court stated:
[N]o liability accrues during the taxable year on account of cancellations which it is expected
may occur in future years, since the events necessary to create the liability do not occur
during the taxable year. Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a liability
does not accrue as long as it remains contingent.
ld. at 200. Brown continu<:s to be cited. E.g., Rev. RuL 80-191, 1980-2 C.B. 168, 169. The
apparent reasonableness of viewing a liability as fixed if statistically accurate predictions of future
cancellations are made "must yield to the countervailing rule of law that no deduction is permitted
if an expense is merely contingent." Aidinoff & Lopata, supra note 3, at 798. See Ertegun v.
Commissioner, 531 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1976) (credit for unsold, returned phonograph records
deductible by wholesaler only upon return of records); Rev. Rul. 81-93, 1981·1 C.B. 322 (denial
of deductions for additions to reserve for uninsured losses).
62. c::J. Rev. Rul. 78-116, 1978-1 C.B. 143 (employer permitted current deduction for sick
leave accrued during year under plan where employees must use sick leave in following year or
be paid for unused leave, even if their employment is terminated).
63. For example, the Code does so provide for reasonable additions to reserves for future
bad debts. LR.C. § l66(c) (1982). But see 1,985 REAGAN PROPOSAl-S, supra note 19, at 21'\-17
(recommending repeal of reserve method for bad debt deductions).
64. ·See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
65. Generally accepted accounting principles require that a contigent obligation to make
payments at some time in the future . . be recorded as an expense in the profit and loss
statement if it is probable that a liability has been incurred as of the date of the financial
statement and if the amount of the liability may then be reasonably estimated. This treat·
ment is mandatory, even if the identity of the payee is unknown.
New York City Bar Report, supra note II, at 711. The amount of the recorded expense will depend
on whether the time of payment is known as of the date of the financial statement. If the time
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Reserves created to cover future estimated expenses may also be treated
differently for tax and financial accounting purposes. Reserves for future liabilities are consistept with, and at times required by, financial accounting standards to protect third parties who rely upon a business's financial statements.
However, a taxpayer has never been permitted .. deduction for "reasonable
additions" to reserves merely because of this financial accounting doctrine.'i<i
Demonstrating the fact of a liability requires more than demonstrating accounting conformity.
2.

The

Mining Paradigm: Ohio River Collieries Co.

However the cases have phrased the issue, the real question has not been
whether contingencies other than the obligor's liability to pay exist - some

of payment is unknown, accrual of the undiscounted amount of the future payment is required,
If the time of payment is known, however, accrual of only the discounted present value of the
future payment is required. !d. See FINANCIAL AccoUNTING STANDARDS BoARD, STATEMENT oF FI·
NANC!AL AccOUNTING STANDARDS No. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES (1975); FINANCIAL Ac·
couNTING STANDARDS BoARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AccouNTING CoNCEPTS No. 5: REcocstTION
AND MEASUREMENT IN fiNANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BusiNESS ENn:RPRISES , 67(d)·(e), at 23·24 (1984).
66. "The prudent business man often sets up reserves to cover contingent liabilities. But they
are not allowable as deductions." Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 44:5, 452 (1930) (Brandeis,
.J.) (footnote omitted).
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, in it.s original form, included a provision, § 462, that
permitted an accrual-method taxpayer tO; deduct "reasonable additions" to reserves for estimated
expenses related to a trade or business. Within less than. a year of enactment, however, § 462 and
§ 452, another new provision permitting deferral of prepayments received by accrual-basis taxpayers,
were repealed retroactively. Ch. 143, §§ l(a)·(b), 69 Stat. 134, 134 (1955).
Does the repeal of S 462 mean that additions to reserves are necessarily not deductible? Answers
to that question vary. The Tax Court has concluded that there are few occasions in which such
additions should be deductible:
The repeal of section 462 removed the only provision providing, in general, for the de·
duction of estimates of expenses to be incurred in the future. While prudent accounting
or financial practices may dictate the establishment of reserves for liabilities to be incurred
in the future, these reserves are not ordinarily deductible.
World Airways, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 786, 801 (1974). See Simplified Tax Records, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 75, 81 n.4 (1963) (repeal of§ 462 indicates that Commissioner's discretion in disallowing deduction will be disturbed only if "clear abuse"). Cf American Auto, Ass'n
v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 695-96 (1961) (repeal of § 452 demonstrates congressional dis·
approval of deferral of prepayments). The Tax Court has expressed its concern that excessively
loose construction of the all events test would result in the judicial "reenactment" of the repealed
§ 462. Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1369, 1377-78 (1981).
On the other hand, § 462 expressly applied only to items for which there was no other statutory
basis for deduction. I.R.C. § 462(d)(l )(A) (1954). Additions to reserves that would have been
deductible under other principles should have remained deductible after the repeaL See Kaiser Steel
Corp. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting government's argument
that estimates reflected in additions to reserve should never be deductible); S. REP. No. 372, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1955-2 C.B. 858, 861; Aidinoff & Lopata, supra note 3, at 810; Gunn,
supra note 11, at 29; McGown, supra note 14, at 260; Stanger, Vander Kam, & Polifka, supra note
42, at 421. See also Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128, 139-40 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(no inference of disapproval of accrual accounting principles to be drawn from repeal of sections
452 and 462).
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contingencies always exist" 7- but how contingent a liability can be and nevertheless qualify for current deductibility. Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Commissioner''"
illustrates the factors involved in making that determination. The contingent
obligation at issue was an archetypical "premature accrual" obligation, the
statutorily required reclamation of land disturbed by strip mining.
Before a state license for strip mining would be issued, Ohio River Collieries
Company was required by Ohio law to submit a reclamation plan and post a
bond to ensure reclamation would be completed. 7" The state had other enforcement mechanisms as well at its disposal, and it had strictly enforced compliance
with the statute in the past. 71
At the end of each tax year the company estimated the cost of the required
reclamation on land that had been mined during the year, and deducted the
undiscounted amounts on its federal income tax return. n The company and
the Internal Revenue Service agreed that the amount of future reclamation costs
had been estimated with "reasonable accuracy," thus meeting the second part
of the all events test/" but the parties differed on whether the company had
demonstrated the fact of the liability. 71
Not unreasonably, Ohio River Collieries Company argued that the fact of
its reclamation liability was fixed since, once ground was broken, no further
event was necessary to solidify the obligation to restore the land. 7'' The precise
timing of the reclamation 76 and the party that would perform the services 77 were
uncertain; nevertheless, unless the state modified its statute or lost its zest for
enforcement, someone at some time was required to complete the reclamation

at the company's expense.

67. Professor Gunn notes that, if the all events test were taken at face value, "accrual
accounting would be an administrative horror." Gunn, supra note II, at 7. At least in the cases
of routine business receipts and outlays, however, it is not read literally. For example, reporting
of routine sales income need not await detailed analysis of the eflects of the Uniform Commercial
Code on the buyer's obligation under a sales contract. ld. at 7-8; 4 B. BrnKER, supra note 3, at
, 105.3.2.

68.

77 T.C. 1369 (1981).

69. See New York City Bar Report, supra note ll, at 705-06.
70. OHio REv. ConE ANN. § 1513 (Page 1978).
71. Ohio River Collieries Co., 77 T.C. at 1370-71.
72. ld. at 1371.
73. See infra notes 96-138 and accompanying text. The government had also agreed that the
reclamation costs were deductible as a business expense. 77 T.C. at 1371 n.3. See supra note 29.
The government's concession on this point must have been based on the premise that the expense,
when paid, would provide no benefit to the company other than the relief of its statutory obligations.
If the company owned the mined land and the reclamation increased the land's value, the expenditures would have been nondeductible capital expenditures. See N.Y. City Bar Report, supra
note 11, at 706.
74. 77 T.C. at 1372-73.
75. ld. at 1371.
76. Ohio law specified only that all reclamation activities except planting be completed within
!2 months of the cessation of mining. ld. at !370.
77. The reclamation might be done by the company, a third party under contract, or, if the
company forfeited its bond, the state of Ohio. Id. at 1375·76. See New York City Bar Report,
supra note 11, at 706.
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The Internal Revenue Service took its traditionally conservative position that
any contingency (other than the obligor's ability to pay) is sufficient to prevent
deductibility. 78 Despite the company's obligation under the Ohio statute, the
Commissioner disagreed that the company proved the fact of the liability and
urged the Tax Court to adopt a standard that looks to economic performance.
The Commissioner argued the deduction could not be taken until the company
became "obligated. to pay cash immediately to an identified person, " 79 and, as
a matter of contract law, this obligation would arise only as the reclamation
activities proceeded. su
The Internal Revenue Service's position is only briefly described in Ohio
River Collieries Co. It is better developed in a widely noted 1978 technical advice
memorandum involving similar facts. 81 First, the memorandum cited cases hold-

78. See JotNT CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 259; Rev, RuL 72·34, 1972-1 C.B. 132;
see also Rev. RuL 77·266, 1977-2 C.B. 236, following Lawyers' Title Guar. Fund v. United States,
508 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1975) (allowing immediate deduction of commission accounts, payable in
seven years, with only contingency the ability to pay). Compare Rev. RuL 79-338, 1979-2 C.B. 212, in
which the Service refused a deduction of a company's estimated liabilities for medical services already
rendered for its employees through its medical benefits program. Before a deduction was allowed,
the program's independent administrator had to certify the claim as eligible for payment. The
possibility of noncertification was sufficient to make the liability contingent. ld. at 213; see also Fred
Nesbit Distrib. Co. v. United States, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9609 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (no
deduction for refundable deposits on bottles until empty containers actually returned); Rev. Rul.
78-273, 1978-2 C.B. 163 (to same effect as Nesbit); Rev. Rul. 70-78, 1970-1 C.B. 120 (no deduction
for addition to reserves for customers' cash discounts, based on customers' outstanding accounts
receivable, in anticipation of discounts in following year); Rev. Rul. 54-608, 1954-2 C.B. 8, modified
by Rev. Rul. 55-426, 1955-1 C.B. 68 (employer permitted no deduction for vacation pay for
following year unless an absolute liability to pay existed regardless of termination of employment).
The Code provides relief from the strict Service position in certain special areas. See I.R.C.
§ 463, as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, S 56l(a), 98 Stat. at 901
(permitting deduction of advance accruals of vacation pay if vested vacation pay plan exists); LR.C.
S 466 (1982) (permitting deduction of advance redemption costs of qualified discount coupons that
are in fact redeemed within certain period).
79. 77 T.C. at 1375. This position was consistent with the Service's published rulings. See
Rev. RuL 76-345, 1976-2 C.B. 134, where the Service rejected deductions for a newspaper publisher's obligation to make contributions to a dealer profit-sharing plan:
Since the group [of dealers] is subject to constant change, neither the ultimate recipients
nor the time of distribution can be ascertained in the year of accrual. The "all events
test" can be met only when the fact of the liability to a specified individual participant
has been clearly established and the amount of liability to each individual can be determined
with reasonable accuracy.
!d. at 135. The Service thereby repudiated a contrary decision of the Court of Claims. See infra
notes 89-90; see also Rev. Rul. 72-34, 1972-1 C.B. 132, 133 ("no deduction will be allowed until
that time· when tke taxpayer becomes currently obligated to make an actual cash payment").
80. 77 T.C. at 1374.
81. LTR 7831003, I.R.S. LETTER RuL. REPS. (CCH) No. 75, at 4 (Apr. 13, 1978); H.R.
REP. No. 432, supra note 5, at 1~53; Jmwr COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 260; SENATE
CoMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 274; see Aidinoff & Lopata, supra note 3, at 795, 797; Collings
& Finley, Controversy Concerning the Accrual rif Reclamation Costs, 28 OIL & GAs TAx Q. 521 (1980);
McGown, supra note 14, at 255.
The rationale is also described, in more summary fashion, in Rev. Rul. 80-182, 1980·2 C.B.
167. This ruling denied dedu~tion, prior to the year of removal, for an obligation to remove
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ing that an accrual-basis taxpayer may not deduct a liability attributable to a
bilateral contract prior to the rendition of the contracted services. 82 Thus, although the amount of some obligation may have been proven,wl contracting in
advance for the reclamation does not establish the fact of any deductible liability.
When the taxpayers entered into such a contract, "the [taxpayers] incurred no
liability but merely agreed to become liable to pay in the event future services
were performed.' ' 84

offshore drilling platforms and well fixtures installed pursuant to a long-term oil and gas lease with
the federal government. See A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF OIL AND GAs
iNVESTMENTS 1 6.04, at 6-9, 6-10 (1983 & 1985 Supp.); F. BuRKE & R. BowHAY, INCOME TAXATION
OF NATURAL RESOURCES , 15.61, at 1565 (1984).
82. LTR 7831003, I.R.S. LETTER RuL. REPS. (CCH) No. 75, at 2 (Apr. 13, 1978). E.g.,
Levin v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 996, 998-99 (1954) (no fixed liability for costs of contracted
advertising services until services performed), a.ff'd, 219 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1955) Amalgamated
Hous. Corp. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 817, 829 (1938) (no fixed liability for costs of renovating
rental housing until renovation occurs), a.ff'd per curiam, 108 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1940). See Rev.
Rul. 80-182, 1980-2 G.B. 167 (citing same cases).
83. Even the amount of the liability might not be so clear. In Levin v. Commissioner, 21
T.C. 996 (1954), a.ff'd, 219 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1955), the taxpayer contracted to have otherwise
deductible advertising services performed, and the Tax Court determined that no fixed liability
existed until the services were performed. But the Levin court also questioned the amou~t of the
liability deducted in advance of performance: "The measure of [the obligation in the event future
services are performed] is not the contract price which the [taxpayers] here seek to deduct but a
contingent response in damages for its breach." 21 T.C. at 998-99 (citing Hallack & Howard
Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 954, 958 (1930)). If this view is correct - and the
Levin suggestion is dictum - showing the amount of a liability arising from a bilateral contract
with reasonable accuracy is presumably impossible: the amount of damages to which the advertiser
may be entitled in the event of breach would be dependent on many variables outside the control
of the taxpayer (extent of consequential damages, advertiser's mitigation of damages, and so on).
84. Levin v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 996, 998 (1954), a.ff'd, 219 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1955).
In Amalgamated Hous. Corp. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 817, 829 (1938), ajj'd per curiam,
108 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1940), the Board of Tax Appeals stated:
·
(Taxpayers] did not have to wait until they had actually paid for the renovating before
they could accrue their liabilities to pay for that renovating, but, on the other hand, they
could not properly accrue as an expense the estimated cost of the renovating prior to the
. . . time that the painter rendered some services.
37 B.T.A. at 829.
In support of its position, the Service also noted its symmetrical policy relating to accrual of
income from a bilateral contract. A taxpayer on the accrual method is not required to include
amounts in income until the earlier of payment, the due date for payment, or economic performance.
LTR 7831003, I.R.S. LETTER RuL. REPS. (CCH) No. 75, at 3 (Apr. 13, 1978). The Service had
at one time argued that accrual and inclusion were required at the time a contract became effective,
but it abandonect'that position in Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128, 132-33, 133 n.6 (1963).
On the fact of liability issue in the technical advice memorandum, the Service also cited two
cases involving contracts to provide services rather thim to secure services, Capital Warehouse Co.
v. Commissioner, 171 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1948), a.ff'g 9 T.C. 966 (1947), and Spencer, White &
Prentis, Inc. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 780 (1944). These
cases, however, are properly interpreted as failures to demonstrate the amount of the liability. For
example, in Spencer, White, the court noted that "the only thing which had accrued was the obligation
to do the work which might result in the estimated indebtedness after the work was performed."
144 F.2d at 47 (emphasis added). That "only" thing is the fact of a liability, although its amount
may be indeterminate. See also Capital Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 171 F.2d at 398 ("the
amount of the liability or cost of handling out was not definite or fixed").
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Second, the Service did not see a pertinent distinction between a contractual
obligation and a statutory obligation: "In both situations the fact of the liability
to incur or pay the service expense does not become fixed, and hence deductible, ... until the taxable year [the J services are rendered. " 85 Indeed, under
the Service's position, a statutory obligation is irrelevant. A statutory obligation
standing alone is indistinguishable from an obligation under a bilateral contract,
and it is therefore insufficient to fix the liability. When coupled with a contractual obligation, the statutory obligation does not strengthen the case for
deductibility. If a taxpayer required by statute to reclaim stripped land contracts
to fulfill the obligation, the statutory requirement is ''a reason or motivation
for the entering into the reclamation contract," nothing more. 86
Finally, the Commissioner saw no decisive difference between the situation
where the strip miner contracts with another party to do the reclamation and
the situation where the miner itself does the reclamation. 87 Accordingly, since

No. 75, at 3 (Apr. 13, 1978).
85. LTR 7831003, I.R.S. LETTER RuL. REPS.
The Service cited Atlas Mixed Mortar Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 245 (1931), in whi.ch
the taxpayer was denied a. deduction for a credit to a reserve to cover the .cost of ~efilling a proposed
sand and gravel pit excavation. A city ordinance required a pennit and bond to cover the cost of
refilling the excavation, id. at 245-46, but the Board of Tax Appeals held that no liability had
been incurred in the year prior to the actual refilling. !d. The precedential value of Atlas .MiX1!d
Mortar on the fact of liability issue is suspect. The Board concluded thl!-t the taxpayer had not
demonstrated the reasonable accuracy ·Of its claimed deductions, id. (lt 248, rendering its conclusion
on the fact ·of liability issue unnecess.ary. In addition, for authority on the fact of liability issue,
the Board relied almost entirely on Ostheimer v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 1.8 (l9.24), where the
claimed liability arose entirely from an obligation under a lease rather than under a statute. See
23 B.T.A. at 247. Gj. Rev. Rul. .80-182, 1980-2 C.B. 167, 168 (no fact of liability arises from
restoration obligation under lease with federal government).
86. LTR 7831003, I.R.S. LETTER RuL. REPS. (CCH) No. 75, at 4 (Apr. 13, 1978). "Why
a taxpayer incurs an expense is of no consequence in determining when such expense was incurred.''
/d. The Service was .concerned about a general acceleration of accruals if expenses related to statutory
obligations were to be routinely considered fixed in fact, such as expenses for legal and accounting
services required to fulfill statutory filing obligations. Id.
The Service's position .on structured settlements prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1984, see
supra notes 34-40 and «<:companying text, is not consistent with its usual performance requirement.
In Rev. Rul. 69-429, 1969~2 C.B. 108, a deduction of the undiscounted amount of a workers'
compensation award was pennitted in the year of the award. See supra note 34. No obvious reason
justifies the Service's treating this scenario .differ.ently from other contingetH liability deductions.
Perhaps, as McGown suggests, a liability ordered by a quasi-judicial authority like a state industrial
commission is less contingent th<1n a liability arising from .a statute, which is subject .to change by
the legislat\lre. It is certainly more fixed than an obligation arising from a contract, which is su'=\ject
to modification by the parties or .differing interpretations by a court. See McGown., supra note 14:,
at 257.
8.7. LTR 7831003, I.R.S. LETTER RuL. REPS. (CCH) No. 75, at 2-4 (Apr. 13, 1978). "Just
as [an] expense is not incurred for Federal income tax purposes until the taxable year the contracted
for reclamation services have been performed, a taxpayer, who takes it upon itself to reclaim the
land, does not incur an expense until .the taxable year it renders the reclamation work." !d. .at
4. The Service cited National Bread Wrapping Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T,C . .550, 556
(1958) (no current deduction for installation expenses .on already sold but .as :yet uninstalled machines); and Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 45 (.2d Cir.) (no deduction
for future restoration work to be performed under contract), m:t. denied, 323 U.S. 780 (1944). See
also Rev. Rul. 80-182, 1980-2 C.B. 167 (citing same cases to same effect).
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the bilateral contract does not fix the liability, whether or not coupled with a
statutory obligation, the miner's decision to undertake the reclamation would
not give rise to a fixed liability in advance of performance.
The Tax Court in Ohio River Collieries Co. found that the statutory and
contractual obligations did establish a liability in fact. The court looked to the
requirements of local law: once a strip miner estimates reclamation costs, posts
a surety bond, and mines the land, his liability is certain. If he does not reclaim
the land, he forfeits the bond under Ohio law. 88 Relying on cases involving
liabilities to trust funds under unemployment benefit plans, 89 the court rejected
the notion that a deduction is necessarily improper when the identity of the
recipient and the precise timing of the payment are unknown.""
This decision in favor of the taxpayer aligned the Tax Court with the more
lenient approach of the courts of appeals. Ohio River Collieries Co. was consistent
with two earlier circuit court opinions involving statutory reclamation obliga·
tions, Harrold v. CommissioneiJJ and Denise Coal v. CommissiQner, 92 decisions that

88. 7i T.C. at 1374. The record contained nothing to support an argument that any further
option was available to the company. Id.
89. Id. at 1375; Reynolds Metals Co. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 943 (1977); Lukens Steel
Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 764 (1969), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1971). In Lukens Steel
and Reynolds Metals, the taxpayers agreed to make certain future payments to trusts under supplemental unemployment benefit plans in accordance with collective bargaining agreements. Although
the amounts in Lukens Steel were reflected on the books in an account entitled ''Contingent Liabilities
Account," the liability was subject to no contingency except the passage of time. 52 T.C. at 78485. The annual liability to the trusts in both Reynolds Metals and Lukens Steel was fixed by events
occurring within the taxable year, and only the identity of the ultimate beneficiaries and the timing
of the payments from company to trust and from trust to beneficiaries were uncertain. 68 T.C.
at 960; 52 T.C. at 784-85. See also Washington Post Co. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1279 (Ct.
Cl. 1969) (deduction of accrued, but unpaid contributions to newspaper dealer profit-sharing plan
approved); Cyclops Corp. v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (following Lukens
Steel); Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 76-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9791 (Ct. Cl. 1976)
(following Lukens Steel).
90. 77 T .C. at 1375. The Internal Revenue Service rejected the decisions in Reynolds Metals,
Lukens Steel, and Washington Post described in supra note 89. E.g., Rev. Rul. 76-345, 1976-2 C.B.
134 (rejecting Washing/on Post); Rev. Rul. 72-34, 1972-1 C.B. 132 (rejecting Lukens Steel). The
specific result in Washington Post was subsequently changed by legislation. Under I.R.C. § 404(d)
( 1982), no deduction may be taken for deferred compensation provided to an independent contractor,
such as the dealers in Washington Post, until the taxable year in which the contractor includes the
compensation in gross income.
91. 192 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1951) (strip mining reclamation obligation under West Virginia
law), rev'g 16 T.C. 134. In two additional coal mining cases, Commissioner v. Gregory Run Coal
Co., 212 F.2d 52 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954), and Patsch v. Commissioner, 208
F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1953), the respective courts had come to the same conclusion as the Fourth
Circuit in Harrold with respect to the fact of the reclamation liability. However, in neither case
had the taxpayer demonstrated that its estimate of the liability was "reasonably accurate," and
the deductions were accordingly disallowed. 212 F.2d at 58; 208 F.2d at 535.
92. 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959) (strip mining reclamation obligation under Pennsylvania
law), rer•'g in pertinent part 29 T.C. 528 (1957). The Internal Revenue Service refused to follow the
decisions in Harrold and Denise Coal. See LTR 7831003, I.R.S. LEITER RuL. REPS. (CCH) No. 75
(AJ;r. 13, 1978), where the Service did not even cite Harrold and Denise Coal on the fact of liability
issue, although it did discuss their treatment of the amount of liability question. ld. at 5-6.
In some respects, Denise Coal was a"much harder case than Ohio River Collieries Co. from the

1985]

DEDUCTION OF FUTURE LIABILITIES

461

the Tax Court had previously refused to follow. 93
In Harrold and Denise Coal, the courts found statutory obligations to reclaim
strip mined land sufficient to establish the fact of the liabilities. Similar analysis
has been applied, and arguably extended, in a group of cases where employers
established reserves, pursuant to state workers' compensation laws, to cover
uncontested liabilities arising from injuries to employees. Additions to the reserves for injuries within the current taxable year were held to be deductible
if the reasonable accuracy of the estimates of future liability was shown. The
fact of the liability was demonstrated by the injury and the obligation under
state law. 94
The workers' compensation cases do not stand for the proposition that the
fact of a liability can be established by probability analysis or by the employer's
historical accident records. Cases have not permitted an employer to deduct in
the current year amounts it will be obligated to pay arising from accidents that
might occur in the future. A large employer can predict those future obligations
with great accuracy, but the Internal Revenue Service and all courts have agreed
that no ·deductible liability exists under those circumstances. The principles of
Brown v. Helvering'l 5 stand firm. The fact of a liability is demonstrated in the
current taxable year only with respect to accidents that have occurred in that
year.
taxpayer's perspective. Pennsylvania authorities in the 1940s and 1950s were apparently much more
lax than Ohio authorities in the 1970s in enforcing the state reclamation statutes. Denise Coal, 271
F.2d at 935. The Third Circuit in Denise Coal nevertheless concluded that laxity in enforcement
did not affect the fact of the reclamation obligation; it merely affected timing. See id.
93. For example, the Tax Court in Denise Coal specifically rejected the Fourth Circuit's decision
in Harrold. 29 T.C. at 549. See Ohio River Collieries Co., 77 T.C. at 1377; see also Kaiser Steel Corp.
v. United States, 717 F.2d 1304, 1307 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting Tax Court's adoption of Harrold
standard in Ohio River Collieries Co.).
94. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1304, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1983);
Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 518 F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1975). Cj. Imperial
Colliery Co. v, United States, 599 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.W. Va. 1984) (deduction, pursuant to West
Virginia law, of present value of projected uncontested total disability claim).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has been the leader in allowing
deductions in uncontested workers' compensation cases. The court has refused to distinguish the
strip mining cases and has rejected the possibly fatal contingencies advanced by the Internal Revenue
Service. The Service has unsuccessfully argued that an employee might recover from his disability
so quickly that he would miss no work, see Kaiser Steel Corp., 717 F.2d at 1306 n.3, or that an
employee might not survive into subsequent taxable years. See Wien Consol. Airlines, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 528 F.2d 735, 737 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'g 60 T.C. 13 (1973), nonacq. 1978-2 C.B.
4; Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 518 F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1975). The
Internal Revenue Service announced that it would not follow the decisions in Crescent Wharf and
Wien. Rev. Rul. 80-191, 1980-2 C.B. 168. See also Gunn. supra note 11, at 28 n.13l:
As applied to the payments in these cases, the all-events test is ambiguous. Looking
at each month's (or year's) payment individually, the test seems not to be satisfied before
the date of payment arrives. The taxpayer will be liable to make any particular payment
only if the recipient remains alive. If, however, one applies the test to the taxpayer's entire
obligation to the injured worker the test is satisfied. The taxpayer has become liable to
pay something and the amount of the liability can be estimated accurately with the use
ljlf actuarial tables.
95. 291 U.S. 193 (1934) (denying deductions for refunds on future cancellations of insurance
policies). See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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Ali Events Test Requirement II: Amount of the Liability

The second prong of the all events test requires the taxpayer to demonstrate
the amount of the liability, "computed with reasonable accuracy." 96 Disputes
regarding the necessary level of precision have mirrored those that have occurred
over the first prong of the all events test; indeed, the two issues in some cases
were not kept analytically distinct. 97 The Commissioner has argued for a high
level of precision, which generally results in a deferral of deductions. Courts,
on the other hand, have been more sympathetic to taxpayers' arguments that
the requirements for deductibility have been met.
The Supreme Court's original statement of the all events test in United States
v. Anderson9 n required that the amount as well as the fact of the liability be
fixed, 99 and, prior to 1951, mere estimates of the amounts of liabilities were
held insufficient to meet the all events test. 100 In 1951, the Fourth Circuit, in
Harrold v. Commissioner, 101 held that the amount of liability need only be "susceptible of estimate with reasonable accuracy in the tax year,' ' not definitely ascertainable. 102 Harrold now represents the unanimous view of the courts of appeals. 103

96.

Treas. Reg. §§ L461-1(a)(2) (CCH 1985); 1.446-l(c)(l)(ii), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163,

164.
97. See supra note 84.
98. 269 u.s. 422 (1926).
99. ld. at 441. See supra note 49. Eighteen years later, in Dixie Pine Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516 (1944), the Court restated the test in similar language: "(A]ll the events
" !d.
must occur in that year which fix the amount and the fact of the taxpayer's liability
at 519.
100. See, e.g., Capital Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 171 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1948):
Certainly the amount of the taxpayer's liability to its customers for the expense of loading
out their merchandise in future years was not "fixed" in the taxable year nor did the
particular event upon which the amount depended occur in the taxable year. That event
was the determination of the actual cost of loading out at the time the merchandise was
ordered out by the customer. Here the petitioner has only estimated such wst.
ld. at 398. See also Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 780 (1944).
101. 192 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1951). See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
102. 192 F.2d at 1006. To justify its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit picked up on apparently
more lenient language in Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934). In Brown, the Supreme Court
stated that Anderson permitted deductibility even though the amount of the liability had not been
"definitely ascertained." !d. at 200. In light of the Supreme Court's rigid language in Dixie Pine
Products Co. (quoted supra note 99), decided 10 years after Brown, the Fourth Circuit probably
overestimated the significance of the phrase in Brown . Indeed, the result in Brown reflects no .obvious
softening of Anderson: deductibility was denied because of the taxpayer's failure to show that the
fact of the liability was "fixed and absolute." 291 U.S. at 201. See supra notes 60·62 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Hughes Properties, lnc. v. United States, 760 F.2d 1292, 1293 (Fed. Cir.)
(additions to reserve for jackpot obligations of gambling casino guaranteed under state law held
deductible), cerl. granted, 106 S. Ct. 522 (1985); ESCO Corp. v. United States, 750 F.2d 1466,
1468-69 (9th Cir. 1985) (workers' compensation liability deductible); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United
States, 717 F.2d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 1983) (workers' compensation liability deductible); Wien
Consol. Airlines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 528 F.2d 735, 737-38 (9th Cir. 1976) (workers' compen·
sation liability to minor children of employees killed in employment deductible); Crescent Wharf
& Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 518 F.2d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 1975) (workers' compensation
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The Tax Court, however, accepted Harrold grudgingly, 104 and the Internal
Revenue Service has consistently demanded greater precision. ws
Although the 195 7 Treasury regulations setting out the all events test 10"
appear to have liberalized the standards for demonstrating the amount of a
liability, the Commissioner viewed the regulatory language as "merely a . . .
paraphrasing of a Supreme Court mandate [in Anderson]. ""' 7 The proper stand·
ard, the government continues to argue, is that, at the end of the taxable year,
the exact amount of the liability should be "determinable by a mere computation based on presently known or knowable factors. " 108
Liabilities that are not definitely ascertained at the end of the taxable year
in question but which are definitely ascertainable, based on known or knowable
facts, are potentially deductible in the government's view.w 9 However, the gov-

liability deductible); Gillis v. United States, 402 F.2d 501, 507 (5th Cir. 1968) (estimated loss from
export sales deductible); Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930, 936-37 (3d Cir. 1959)
(reclamation liability deductible); Hilinski v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 703, 705 (6th Cir. 1956)
(assumed cost of contract completion deductible); Patsch v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 532, 534-35
(3rd Cir. 1953) (Harrold principles approved, but reclamation obligation not deductible because no
attempt made to estimate probable cost of reclamation of area actually mined). See also Aidinoff &
Lopata, supra note 3, at 795-96.
104. The Tax Court has come to accept the "reasonably estimable" language. See Ohio River
Collieries Co. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1369, 1373 (1981) (citing Harrold); Southern Pac. Trans.
Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497, 634 (1980) (citing Harrold); World Airways, Inc. v. Com·
missioner, 62 T.C. 786, 797 (1974); Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 750,
755 (1968) (citing Harrold). Although the precise amount of the liability need not be ascertained,
the Tax Court does note that the a11UJunt requirement "provides an element of certainty," and the
Tax Court's view of what is reasonably estimable differs from that of the Fourth Circuit. See Ohio
River Collieries Co., 77 T.C. at 1373; LTR 7831003, I.R.S. LETTER RuL. REPS. (CCH) No. 75,
at 4-6 (Apr. 13, 1978); infra note 121 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 1983)
(rejecting government's contention "that to meet the all-events test, the amount of liability must be
fixed, definite and determinable by objective facts existing at the end of the year for which deduction
ts sought").
106. See supra text accompanying note 50.
107. LTR 7831003, I.R.S. LETTER RuL. REPS. (CCH) No. 75, at 4 (Apr. 13, 1978). Treas.
Reg. § 1.461-J(c)(l)(ii), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163, 164, requires that the amount of liability
be determined only with "reasonable accuracy," not that the amount be fixed, a standard that
appears to be considerably more liberal than the Anderson standard. See supra note 49. If the draftsmen
of the regulations intended simply to paraphrase Anderson, they did a poor job of it.
From the Commissioner's perspective, the Harrold court dramatically extended well-settled law.
The Service said the Fourth Circuit had misconstrued older cases to support its position, LTR
7831003, I.R.S. LETTER RuL. REPS. (CCH) No. 75, at 6 (Apr. 13, 1978). See supra note 102.
Indeed, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged, but rejected, the contrary prior authority:
In any event, we think that the ability to make an approximate estimate should be the
determining factor in each case, rather than the literal application of the formula that an
asset or a liability may not be accrued in any taxable year prior to its liquidation, unless
both the existence and the amount thereof is fixed and certain.
192 F.2d at 1004.
108, LTR 7831003, I.R.S. LETTER RuL. REPS. (CCH) No. 75, at 4 (Apr. 13, 1978). See supra
note 105.
109. L TR 7831003, I.R.S. LETTER Rut.. REPS. (CCH) No. 75, at 6 (Apr. 13, 1978). The
Service's reading of the pre-Harrold case law, although narrow, is defensible. The language of Brown
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ernment considers liabilities that are not ascertainable at that time, because all
facts on which the calculations depend are not fixed,"" not to be deductible. 111
The government has drawn support for its position from the trilogy of
Supreme Court cases involving prepayments received by accrual-basis taxpayers
for services to be provided on demand in the future. 112 Taxpayers argued un·
successfully that, under basic accrual principles, ll:l the amounts should not be
considered earned until the services were performed. The extent of the deferral
asked by the taxpayers was uncertain, however, because the taxpayers were not
able to predict precisely the amount of net income to be earned from the
contracts. 114 The government has contended that the trilogy demonstrates that
estimates are unacceptable for tax accounting purposes. 115 The government has
pointed as well to the Supreme Court's hostility to estimates in Thor Power Tool
Co. 11. Commissioner, 116 where the Court stated that, while financial accounting

v. Helvering relied upon by the Fourth Circuit, see supra note 102, was (1) dictum since the fact of
the liability had not been shown and that failure was sufficient to defeat deductibility, and (2)
consistent with the distinction made in the text between those liabilities whose amounts are definitely
ascertainable and those whose amounts are definitely ascertained.
The result in Anderson fits the Service's analysis. The munitions tax liability at issue, which the
taxpayer was required to deduct in 1916 because the all events test had been met in that year,
had not then been definitely ascertained, although all events had occurred to make it ascertainable.
See supra note 49.
110. Deduction would depend on other requirements for deductibility. See supra note 29.
111. In strip mining cases, the Commissioner has usually viewed the amount of reclamation
expense~ as non-ascertainable until the reclamation occurs, and, accordingly, no deduction should
be permitted until that time. LTR 7831003, I.R.S. LETTER RuL. REPS. (CCH) No. 75, at 6 (Apr.
13, 1978). The Commissioner's stipulation to the reasonable accuracy of the estimates in Ohio River
Collieries Co. was an anomaly. See Gunn, supra note II, at 30; irifra note 121.
112. See Levey, Cameron & Sciortino, Kaiser Steel Case Makes New Strides Toward the Deductibility
of Self-insurance Reserves, 60 J. TAx'N 74, 75 (1984). The trilogy is Schludc v. Commissioner, 372
U.S. 128 (1963); American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); Automobile Club
v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957). See supra note 44.
113. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
114. The boundaries of the trilogy have not been well-defined. See Gunn, supra note 11, at
15·17. The cases are generally interpreted as requiring immediate inclusion in income of any
prepayments. However, some commentators and courts have argued that the holdings are limited
to cases in which the income cannot be ascertained because the time and extent of future services
cannot be predicted. If the time and extent of future services can be ascertained, however, deferral
may be appropriate. See, e.g., Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1967) (deferral
permitted of prepayments for tickets, parking, and broadcasting rights attributable to baseball games
to be played in next taxable year); Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. United States, 585 F.2d 988 (Ct.
Cl. 1978) (portion of prepaid interest deferred until "earned"); Boise Cascade Corp. v. United
States, 530 F.2d 1367 (Ct. Cl.) (per curiam) (prepayment for services not dependent on customer
demand deferred until services performed), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 ( 1976).
115. See Levey, Cameron & Sciortino, supra note 112, at 75 & 75 n.lO (citing government's
reply brief in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1983)).
116. 439 U.S. 522 (1979). In Thor Power Tool, consistent with generally accepted financial
accounting principles, the taxpayer wrote down its excess inventory of spare parts to net realizable
value (generally scrap value), although the parts continued to be held for sale at original prices.
No realization event had occurred, but the taxpayer also deducted the amount of the write-down.
!d. at 527-30. The Commissioner successfully challenged the deduction on the ground that the
write-down did "not clearly reflect income." !d. at 533, 537·38.
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"is hospitable to estimates," tax accounting principles "can give no quarter to
uncertainty.'' 1 17
The Tax Court took a position between the Commissioner and the courts
of appeals on the amount of liability issue. It accepted the "reasonably estimable" language from Harrold, 118 yet demanded greater precision than that required by the courts of appeals. For example, in Ohio River Collieries Co., the
Tax Court, consistent with its earlier holdings in Harrold 11 '' and Denise Coal, 12"
expressed serious doubt that reclamation costs could ever be estimated with rea·
son able accuracy. 121
The courts of appeals, by permitting the deduction of reasonable estimates
under the Harrold principle, opened the door to a large number of estimation
issues. For example, when should the accuracy of estimates be evaluated? What
is the role to be played by statistical analysis? The debate has been most
vigorous before the Ninth Circuit, a court which significantly liberalized the
requirements a taxpayer must meet to demonstrate the amount of a liability.
The Ninth Circuit stated in ESCO Corp. v. United Statesm that, in general, the
reasonable accuracy of estimates is determined based upon the facts available
to the taxpayer at the end of the taxable year. m

117. Id. at 543. See RCA Corp. v. United States, 664 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1981) (following the
trilogy and Thor Power Tool), ccrt. denied, 457 U.S. 1133 (1982).
The government's argument that estimates are not permitted appears inconsistent with the
regulation that sets out the all events test, which provides for the possibility of future adjustments
to correct for inaccuracies in the amount deducted. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-l(a)(2) (CCH 1985);
infra note 129 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 104.
119. 16 T.C. 134, 139, rev'd, 192 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1951).
120. 29 T.C. 528, 549 (1957), rev'd in pertinent part, 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. !959).
121. Ohio River Collieries Co., 77 T.C. at 1373-74. "We will continue to adhere to our decision
in Denise Coal . . in those cases where we find that accrued costs are not susceptible of reasonable
estimation." !d. at 1377. Apparently the Commissioner was unsuccessful in this case, not because
of a change in position by the Tax Court, but because the Commissioner had conceded this critical
issue, thereby "substantially circumscrib[ing] his area of maneuverability." /d. at 1374.
In addition to Harrold and Denise Coal, the Tax Court cited its earlter decisions in Vincent v.
Commissioner, 19 T.C. 501 (1952), aff'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Gregory Run Coal Co., 212
F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1954), and Patsch v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 189 (1952), aff'd, 208 F.2d 532
(3d Cir. 1953). In both cases the court found that, although a noncontingent reclamation liability
existed, the taxpayer had not established the amount of the liability. See supra note 91.
Congressional committees drafting the Tax Reform Act of 1984 viewed Ohio River Collieries Co.
as holding that "surface mining reclamation costs that could be estimated with reasonable accuracy
were properly accrued when the overburden was removed." CoNFERENCE CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note B, at 879; SENATE CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 274. See also JoiNT CoMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 273. The statement is accurate, but misleading given the Tax Court's reservations
about a taxpayer's ability generally to make reasonable estimates.
122. 750 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1985).
123. The inquiry is
[wJhether the estimate of expenses was made with reasonable accuracy on the basis of facts
and procedures available to the taxpayer at the end of the tax year in question .... This is tested
by examining the reasonableness, reliability, and acceptance of the taxpayer's methodology,
as well as evaluating the estimates on the basis of actual experience in hindsight.
/d. at 1468 (emphasis added) (citing Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United States, 717 F.2d at 1308-09).
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Subsequent events do not make previously inaccurate estimates reasonable,
but the amount of actual future liability is obviously one indicator of the accuracy of a past estimate. 124 The Ninth Circuit concluded, however, that hindsight should be given only limited significance in evaluating accuracy because
the primary concern is the accuracy of the estimate when made. 12 '' Accordingly,
the court approved estimates that were determined with appropriate methodology, 126 but that differed from actual liability by as much as 18.5 percent in
a particular year. 127
When the taxpayer overestimates the amount of future liabilities, a particularly acute premature accrual problem arises. 12 H The Treasury regulations provide for the possibility of overestimates: once the exact amount of the liability
is determined, the amount of the excess estimate is taken into income. 12 " Yet
a correction only lessens, rather than eliminates, the economic effect of the
premature accrual: a future liability with a present value of one dollar in these
circumstances may generate a current deduction of more than one dollar. no
Despite the economic deficiencies, several courts have approved the deduction
of significant overestimates. The Claims Court, for example, in General Dynamics
v. United States, n 1 permitted the deduction of reasonable estimates of future

See generally Levey, Cameron & Sciortino, supra note 112. Commercial and scientific reasonableness
as well as industry acceptance are important factors in testing accuracy. ESCO Corp., 750 F. 2d at
1468; Kaiser Steel Corp., 717 F.2d at 1308-10.
124. See, e.g., Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 528, 549 (1957), rev'd in pertinent
part, 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959); Patsch v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 189, 198 (1952), ajj'd, 208

F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1953).
125. 750 F.2d at 1468-69. The Court stated: "Our refusal to rely on actual experience in
[Wien Consolidated Airlines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 528 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1976)] illustrates
that the key consideration is whether the estimates could have been expected to be reasonably
accurate when made." 750 F.2d at 1469.
126. Id. at 1468-69.
127. The estimates were, however, found to be better than industry norms. ld. at 1469. Even
if hindsight should be given more weight than the Ninth Circuit professed to accord it, deviation
in ESCO Corp. was relatively easy to accept. The amounts deducted were less than the liabilities
ultimately incurred, thereby incorporating a rough discounting process into the deduction computations. !d.
The Tax Reform Act of 1984 had been enacted when the Ninth Circuit decided ESCO Corp.,
but the Act was not yet .effective. Although the court therefore did not rely on the Act, it noted
that the "conservative underestimates" roughly incorporated time value of money concepts into
the deduction scheme, and the decision was consistent with the theory of the Act. ld.; see infra notes
191-216 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 127 (conservative underestimates present such difficulties to lesser extent).
This is not to say that underestimates create no premature accruals. If currently deductible, an
underestimate that exceeds the present value of a future liability overstates the economic cost of
the obligation.
129. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (CCH 1985).
130. Consider a $200 deduction taken in 1983 for a 1990 liability that in fact is only $100.
A $100 deduction taken in 1983 would have been economically excessive, since the present value
of the future obligation was only $58.35. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. A $200
deduction in 1983 would have compounded the economic error. Even if the taxpayer includes $100
in income in 1990 - leaving a net deduction of $100 - he has received the benefit of seven
years' use of the tax savings attributable to the additional $100 deduction in 1983.
131,. 6 Cis. Ct. 250, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 'f 9783 (1984), ajf'd, 773 F.2d 1224 (Fed.
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claims although only 82.2 percent of the amount put aside was subsequently
paid. m In Judge Seto's view, the circuit court opinions in Harrold1' 1:1 and Denise
Coalm stand for the proposition that an estimate may be deemed reasonably
accurate even if actual costs are as low as 48 percent of the estimate. m
Aggregate analysis has never been permissible to determine whether a lia·
bility in fact exists.'"' However, the Ninth Circuit, in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United
States, m did permit the amount of the liability to be determined by an aggregate
claim analysis, rather than claim-by-claim. Thus, although actual injuries were
necessary to establish the fact of the liability, the court permitted the use of
statistical analysis of the aggregate claims to establish the reasonable accuracy
of the amount of the liability.' :w
4.

Fixed Liabilities and the Time Value of Money

The controversy between the Commissioner and the courts on the application
of the all events test was, in many respects, misdirected. The ultimate issue
was the timing of deductions, a factor of clear economic significance. However,
the debates have turned not on economics but on the nature of contractual and
statutory obligations and on the necessary level of statistical precision.
With the issues so framed, courts that rejected the Commissioner's position
had the better of the arguments. The Commissioner grossly underestimated the
obligatory nature of statutes and bilateral contracts.''"' For ex&mple, it made

Cir. 1985). General Dynamics involved the deductibility of amounts accrued under a medical selfinsurance plan.
132. 6 Cis. Ct. at 256, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) , 9783, at 85,324.
133. 192 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1951).
134. 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959).
135. 6 Cis. Ct. at 256, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas . (CCH) 1' 9783, at 85,324. Judge Seto's reading
of the two cases is suspect. The judge viewed Harrold as permitting the deduction of the entire
estimated amount where actual costs were only 8!% of that amount. However, the taxpayer in
Harrold had amended its return and was seeking to deduct only the lesser, actual figure. Viewed
as an estimate, the amended figure was 100% accurate. See 192 F.2d at 1003. The Third Circuit
in Denise Coal clearly permitted less than precise estimation, but at no point did the court hold
that 48% was sufficient. Indeed, it did not quantify the measure of accuracy. 271 F.2d at 936.
136. Future obligations under a state worker's compensation law, for example, will be a statistical near certainty for a large employer. However, the fact of the liability is demonstrated only
with respect to injuries incurred in the current taxable year. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying
text.
137. 717 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1983).
138. ld. at 1309-10. See H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 5, at 1253; jOINT CoMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 259; SENATE CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 265; see generally Levey, Cameron
& Sciortino, supra note 112.
139. Bilateral contracts are not obligation free; certainly parties entering into such contracts
view themselves as incurring liabilities. Rules have been devdoped to. deal with the situation in
which one party to a bilateral contract fails to perform, but those rules do not affect the existence
of a contract. See E. FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTs H 8.1-.2 (1982). Professor Farnsworth explains:
To the extent practicable, a court will supply terms under which a party's duties are
conditioned on the performance to be given in return. A party whose duty is in this way
• impliedly conditional on the other party's performance is afforded the security of not having
to perform unless the other party has performed. Suppose that a house painter promises
to paint a house in return for the homeowner's promise to pay $1,000. Even though the
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little sense in Ohio River Collieries Co. to view the company as having no liability
in fact to reclaim the strip mined land. Contingencies could be imagined, but
they were for all practical purposes imaginary. Moreover, the Commissioner's
argument regarding the necessity of absolute precision in determining the amount
of a liability was not only unrealistic, but also contrary to the
own
regulations.
The Commissioner's position would have been strengthened by an economic
analysis. The Commissioner's strict interpretation of the all events test had the
effect, when accepted, of delaying deductions, thereby bringing the time of
deduction and the time of payment more closely into alignment. This result
would have lessened the benefit of a premature accrual. Nevertheless, the Commissioner did not inject the economic issue into the analysis under the all events
test.
Perhaps the Commissioner felt it improper to introduce economic concepts
into a test which makes no reference to those concepts. Yet he had nothing to
lose and a great deal to gain by raising the economic argument. By limiting
himself to formalistic attacks under the all events test, the Commissioner was
often unsuccessful, and the revenue losses to the Treasury were dramatic. Although, in Ohio River Collieries Co., Ohio law required reclamation to occur
within twelve months of the cessation of mining, and thus the time value benefits
of the accelerated deduction may not have been great, tw the time between
deduction and payment in other cases has been extremely long. 111 In the latter
cases the opportunity existed to argue that the excessive time interval made the
fact of the liability contingent and the am~mnt of the liability uncertain. The

language of the contract does not make the homeowner's promise to pay conditional on
the painter's performance, it is impliedly conditional on his performance. lf the painter
paints the house, payment becomes due; if he docs not paint it, payment docs not become
due.
Id. at 536-37. Should one party to a contract with such an implied condition of exchange not
perform, that event may serve to "terminate [the other party's] duty of immediate perl(,-mancc
or one to pay damages for breach." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 230 (198!).
The Commissioner's position on the fact of liability issue is that no liability exists until any
implied conditions of exchange have been fulfilled. Perhaps viewed from the homeowner's perspective
in Farnsworth's example, there is something to be said for this. But, from the standpoint of the
painter, can it really be said that he has no liability under the contract until be performs? He
must either paint the house and incur costs associated with that painting, enter into yet another
contract with a third party to paint the house, or respond in a suit for damages. The dollar amount
may be unclear, but the painter has a fixed obligation.
A statutory requirement would strengthen the obligation. With respect to a starutory reclamation
obligation, see New York City Bar Report, supra note ll, at 706:
[Ijt seems clear that if the mandated payments were simply an obligation to make a lump
sum payment to the state upon the completion of mining . ., the "all events" test would
be met. In that case, the liability would be . . a fixed obligation to make a iixed payment
in the future, with the payer receiving nothing in return, This is similar to a fixed tax
obligation payable in the future, or an obligation to pay accrued rent at a future date.
140. The full benefit, however, is impossible to determine from the facts as presented by the
Tax Court. For example, the time of payment for the reclamation may have been delayed beyond
the time of reclamation. See infra notes 233-42 and accompanying text.
141. See infra note 145.
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Commissioner could have pointed to the bizarre economic results that would
follow if the deduction were permitted in the year of accruaL
Because the Service did not make the potentially powerful argument, however, the cases are clear: if length of time between accrual and payment is a
factor in determining when a future obligation may be deducted, it is not
because of the all events test. For example, in the widely noted Mooney
Inc. v. United States, H 2 the taxpayer, with each aircraft it sold, issued a '
bond," a
to pay $1,000 when the aircraft was permanently retired
from service. Although the date of retirement could have been more than thirty
years from the date of sale, ' 43 Mooney deducted $1,000 in the year of issue of
each of the bonds. The Commissioner's challenge to the deductions was sue·
cessful, but not because of the all events test. On the issues under the all events
test, the taxpayer prevailed: the fact of liability was fixed in the year of issue
144
because it was certain that the aircraft would be retired from
and
the amount of the liability, $1,000, was subject to no uncertainty. Nevertheless,
the Commissioner prevailed because he convinced the court that the time interval between accrual and retirement was "too long," and thus the deduction
did "not clearly reflect income. " 145

142. 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969). See, e.g., Aidinoff & Lopata, supra note 3, at 800-06;
Ferencz, supra note 11, at 839; Gunn, supra note II, at 3·4; New York City Bar Report, supra
note 11, at 712.
143. 420 F.2d at 409.
144. There is no contingency in this case as to the fact of liability itself; the only contingency
relates to when the liability will arise. . . [ H]ere there is no doubt at all that the liability will
occur since airplanes, like human begins, regrettably must cease to function.
420 F.2d at 406 (footnotes omitted).
145. !d. at 409·-10. &e infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text. Perhaps in peculiar situations
length of time could affect the fact of a liability. For example, Mooney Aircraft contains a suggestion
that in some circumstances length of time might make it unlikely that a liability would in fact
ever be satisfied. 420 F.2d at 410. That uncertainty sounds suspiciously like a contingency fatal
to deductibility, unless the uncertainty relates only to the obligor's ability to pay. See also Rcyno!ds
Metals Co. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 943, 960 (197'7) (result permitting deduction might be
different if time period sufficiently long that liability is "practical nullity"). Judge Hastie's concurrence in Lukens Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 1131, 1135 (3d Cir. 1971), addresses
the same issue:
That finding [that amounts would hav<: to be paid out within a short time] makes it
unnecessary to decide whether sums committed to such a fund as this are then immediately
deductible as an accrued business expense if the time of future disbursement is entirely
speculative and is as likely to occur decades hence as in the near future. Yet the opinion
of the Court seems broad enough to cover that situation.
Generally, however, uncertainty a.~ to time of payment, regardless of the potential time period
involved, has not been deemed to make a liability contingent, and has not adversely affected a
taxpayer's ability to demonstrate the amount of the liability. E.g., Crescent Wharf & Warehouse
Co. v. Commissioner, 518 F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1975) (all events test met although disability
under workers' compensation plan might not occur until future time); Vv'ashington Post Co. v.
United States, 405 F.2d 1279 (Ct. CL 1969) (liabilities with respect to dealer profiHharing plans
deductible although date of obligation uncertain); Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930,
935 (1959) (fixed reclamation obligation deductible even though timing of fulfillment of obligation
not of the essence). In Washington Post Go., it was conceivable that the period between deduction

4:70

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

Clear
1.

[Vol. XXXVI!

Income

Clear Reflections: Introduction

If a deduction survived
under the all events test
Reform J\ct of
to further challenge on the
did "not
Unlike the all CVfonts test, whose
did not offer the Commissioner a clear
to wake an eeonomlc attaek
on
the dear refle<:tion standard was
accrual that
overstates the economic cost of a deduction could
be construed
a
distortion of income.
The Commissioner had a basis for
R.ecent cases,
ferrt:d to the
the
Commissioner broad discretion in
and determine
ta.xpayers
. . . 'It is not the
the relative merits of systems of
"' "" When the Commissioner chal·
the taxpayer is therefore left with the difllnxlt
burden of
Commissioner has abused his discretion."''
The Com.missioner has nevertheless seldom attacked premature accruals on
the basis of the clear reflection
and he has at no time presented
economic concepts to
a
His only notable success was
150
where the Fifth Circuit upheld the Comrnissioner' s denial
deduc·
tions in the year of issue for the $1,000
bonds." Provided with no
by the
however, the court did not
that the
before re·
30 years,'' w.as "too
of the

and payment could exceed 30 years. See Aidinoff & Lopata, supra note 3, at 802 & n.80~ In
Denise Coal, the Third Circuit did not even mention the fact that the period between accrual and
economic performance could be
long as 11 years, although the time p(•riods involved are dear
from the Tax Court's opinion . .'See 29 T.C. at 540, 549: Aidinoff & Lopata,
803.
to require
146. LR.C. § 146(b) (1982). Early cases interpreted "dear reflection of
only that books be kept "fairly and honestly." See, e.g., Osterloh v. Lucas, 37 F.2d 277, 271l (9th
1930). The now governing general - very general ~- pt·inciple is that im:omc must
computed "with as much
as standard methods of accounting practice permit. ' Caldwell
v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d
115 (2d Cir. 195:1).
147. See Ferencz, supra note 11, at 838. This deference is
by consistency with prior
and the duty l\ot
apply
accounting ruks arbitrarily. New York City Bar Report,
1 , at 712.
HB. United Stares v. Ca!!o, 3M U.S. 102, 114 (l966) (citing Brown v. Hdvering, 291 U.S.
!93, 204·05 (1930)). See also Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner,
U.S. 5?.2, 540 (19'79).
v, Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 532 (!979); RCA Corp. v.
1981), cerl, denied, 457 U.S. l 133 (1982).
States, 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969). See sufJru text
Cornrnissionerj 32 .C.M.
bonds"
r.lisl.ributor of the
40'HO.
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the court reasoned, it was unrealistic to view the obligation as related
the income
in the year of sale. 152
Aircraft stands for the
that a liability which in fact exists
and whose amount is not
to doubt ($1 ,000) may not be deductible
if the liability is to be fulfilled too far in the future. Mooney Aircraft,
although iacking an economic
should have laid the foundation for
development of the dear reflection doctrine. But nothing happened.
lV!ooney Aircraft
far
commentary than jurisprudence. The Commissioner cited the
m
oue published ruling 153 and later apparently
abandoned the
reflection arg11rrH~nt: in a number of cases he conceded
a deducti<Al which satisfies the all events test clearly reflects income. 154
The Commissioner's hesitation to invoke the clear reflection rule may reflect
in the
statute. Section 446(b) of the Internal Revenue
that, "if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the
of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the
opinion of the
reflect income.""'" By its terms, the statute
to challenge an accounting method only if
the threshold determination m has been made that the method currently used
reflect income. Consequently, in several cases the Commissioner
from
improvements in already acceptable methods of
least where the taxpayers had consistently used the challenged
methods over long periods. 157
Premature accruals do not
reach the threshold required for invocation
of the Commissioner's power to challenge an accounting method. As long as
the accrual-method taxpayer is consistent in his accounting, he can plausibly
argue that the deduction of a liability meeting the all events test does reflect
income
and that the Commissioner therefore has no authority to require
deferral of the deduction.
The Internal Revenue Code takes. as its
point the
financial

!52. The wurt stated that to regard the bond as a current expense would be "to let an
accounting fiction obscure the business and fiscal realities that are the heart of this case. In exercising
discretion the Commissioner need not dose his eyes to these realities." /d. at 410.
153. Rev. Rul. 7!l·212, 1978.. J C.B. 139 (accounting for store coupons).
!54. See Ferencz, supra note I j, at 839. In Ohio River Collieries Co., for example, the Com·
missioner did not even make the "dear rdlection" argument. 77 T.C. at 1371 n.4. See also W.S.
Badcock Corp. v. Commissioner, 491 F.2d 1226, 1223 (5th Cir. 1974) (deductibility of future
with stipulation that accrual method dearly reflects income);
liability challenged under all events
30242 Qan.. 10, 1980) ("The accrual method of accounting clearly reflects income when

LR.C. § 446(b)
i %. It is not intuitively
II, at 394 . 98.
157.

who should make the threshold determination. See Note, .wpra

Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1029, 1042-52
Commissioner, '15 T
410, 423 .. 24 (1980); Madison Gas &. E!ec.
521, 555·57 (1979); Au bum Packing Co.
Commissioner, 60
Commissioner,
T
610, 622·23 (1971 ); Fort Howard Paper
275, 286,137 (1967).
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accounting method, 158 and the Code specifically designates an accrual method
as an acceptable over-all method of accounting. " 9 The regulations provide that
a taxpayer must in general compute his taxable income by utilizing the same
method of accounting employed in computing his regular business income. 16"
The key to meeting the clear reflection of income standard is a consistent
application of accounting principles and a consistent treatment of items of income or expense in different taxable years. 161 Thus, if a strip miner consistently
deducts future reclamation expenses in conformity with general industry practice
and generally accepted accounting principles, 162 his method of accounting should
ordinarily be deemed to reflect income clearly. Once this determination has
been made, analysis under section 446(b) should end.
2.

The Matching Principle and Clear Reflection of Income

A factor complicating the Commissioner's use of section 446(b) is that, in
many cases, premature accruals are fully consistent with generally accepted
accounting principles. 16:l To a financial accountant, "clear reflection of income"
means matching revenue and related costs in the same taxable year. 164 Permitting accrual prior to economic performance may be necessary to satisfy the
matching principle. In Ohio River Collieries Ca., for example, the result of accruing the future liability was to allocate a legitimate expense of strip mining,
the reclamation obligation, to a taxable year in which the ground was disturbed
and revenue was generated. 165

158. I.R.C. S 446(a) (1982). See supra note 2. More precisely, the statute refers to the method
used by the taxpayer in "keeping his books." "Books" refers to records, ledgers, and journals
rather than to financial statements. See Patchen v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 544, 550 (5th Cir.
1958).
159. I.R.C. § 446(c)(2) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)(1)(ii), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. !63,
164.
160. "Except for deviations permitted or required by . . special accounting treatment [such
as for research and experimental expenditures], taxable income shall be computed . . . on the basis
of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books." Treas. Reg. § 1.446·
l(a)(l) (CCH 1985).
161. A method of accounting which reflects the consistent application of generally
accepted accounting principles in a particular trade or business in accordance with accepted
conditions or practices in that trade or business will ordinarily be regarded as clearly
reflecting income, provided all items of gross income and expense are treated consistently
from year to year.
Treas. Reg. S 1.446-l(a)(2) (CCH 1985).
162. See infra note 165.
163. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
164. See Gunn, supra note 11, at I.
165. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, in an Accounting Research Study,
explained proper financial accounting for restoration costs:
The undertaking to restore or improve property upon completion of mining operations
is an unavoidable cost of producing minerals. If matching is to be obtained, revenue should
bear a ratable portion of these costs. . . .
Failure to record substantial accumulations of restoration costs to which the mining
company is committed by its operations understates current expense and overstates expense
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In many instances, tax law has uncritically adopted the matching principle
as its own. The principle has been understood to reflect the statutory mandate
that a taxpayer's method of accounting "clearly reflect income. " 166 As explained
by the Supreme Court in United States 11. Anderson, 167 the accrual method and
matching are synonymous. The accrual method is intended to enable taxpayers
''to make their returns ... by charging against income earned during the
taxable period, the expenses incurred in and properly attributable to the process
of earning income during that period. " 168 The all events test, applied to fix
the inclusion of income and the deductibility of expenses, facilitates this result;

of some future period when restoration must be made.
AICPA, Financial Reporting in the Extractive Industries, AccoUNTING RESEARCH STUDY 11, at 74 (1969).
See also text accompanying note 64.
The result in Ohio River Collieries Co., consistent with the matching principle, is usefully contrasted
to World Airways, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 786 (1974), where an airline company sought
to deduct future overhaul costs for its airframes and engines. The periodic overhauls were necessary
to meet requirements set by the Federal Aviation Administration, and the company had entered
into a maintenance contract with another major air carrier. !d. at 789-90. For a number of reasons,
the Tax Court denied deductibility. The company was unsuccessful in demonstrating the fact of
the liability because of the existence of several contingencies, including the possibility that the
airplanes might be sold or permanently grounded. ld. at 804-05. Most important, the estimated
future overhaul expenses
were not part of the operative expenses incurred in the process of earning the income received
during the taxable years. The expenses accrued were estimates of expenses expected to be
incurred in future years which would enable or permit petitioner to earn similar income
in the future.
Id. at 805 (emphasis in original). In contrast, the restoration expenses in Ohio River Collieries Co.
indisputably related to the income generated by the strip mining itself and not to a potential future
use of the land.
166. The requirements of§ 446(b) apply to all methods of accounting, not just accrual methods.
Nonetheless, even though it makes no attempt to match income and revenue, see supra note 19,
the over-all cash method of accounting has always been deemed to meet the mandate of )
446(b) that a method of accounting "clearly reflect income." See Gunn, supra note ll, at 6 n.22.
Particular characteristics of the cash method may, however, be abused, and in some cases the
results of an unmodified cash method may therefore "not clearly reflect income." For example,
a great deal of litigation has developed regarding the proper treatment of prepaid expenses by cashmethod taxpayers, see Cliff & Levine, supra note 11, at 113·14; Note, supra note 11, at 380-82,
and the Tax Reform Act of 1984 limited the deductibility of such prepaid expenses. See supra note
13.
167. 269 U.S. 422 (1926). See supra note 49.
168. 269 U.S. at 440. A noted commentator explains Anderson in this way: "Anderson . . . is
chiefly interested in matching expenses with the particular revenues with which those expenses happen
to be associated; the Court's aim was to assure that the taxpayer's gross income and related expenses
would be reported in the same taxable period." M. CH1RELSTE1N, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 220
(4th ed. 1985) (emphasis in original).
Following Anderson, many judicial decisions have treated the accrual method as synonymous with
the accounting process of matching . .SCe, e.g., Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d
400, 403 (5th Cir. 1969); Citizens Hotel Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1942);
Lichtenberger-Ferguson Co. v. Welch, 54 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1931); Galatoire Bros. v. Lines,
23 F.2d 676, 676-77 (5th Cir. 1928); American Express Co. v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 498, 504
(1925). See also Hahn, Methods of Account£ng: Their Role in the Federal Income Tax Law, 1960 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1, 51.
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it is necessary to achieve the "objective of
the
expenses
with the income to which they are allocable." 169
A significant body of case law permitting premature accruals has relied on
the matching principle. In fact, one court of
in Denise Coal,
that accrual of a reclamation obligation prior to economic
may be
necessary for the clear reflection of income. 170
Many other examples can be cited. In Pacific
Products Co. v. Commissioner, 171 the court considered the proper treatment of a fruit canner's estimated
future shipping expenses. The deductions, based on past
were intended to match the accrued income for the taxable years in which
argued to the Tax
were ordered by customers. 172 The Commissioner
Court that the deductions did not clearly reflect income, m but the
court reversed. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit noted that the
counting system was used by the entire industry and had a substantial intuitive
apappeal. Furthermore, in the court's opinion, the Commissioner's
in
proach would have grossly distorted the taxpayer's true income. 174
Schuessler v. Commissioner, 175 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the deduction of
future expenses associated with obligations under a service guarantee contract
by the Commissioner. 176
more accurately reflected income than the method
The Commissioner had argued for reporting total receipts in the year of sale
and reporting the expenses only as the guarantee's services were provided.
Given the apparently impressive history of the matching principle, it is

169. 4 B. BrTTKER, supra note 3, 1 105.3.1, at 105·48.
170. "The taxpayer on an accrual system of accounting will not have his books 'dearly reflect'
the state of his income if he does not make such a reserve (for reclamation obligations]." Denise
Coal, 271 F.2d at 936.
171. 219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955).
172. !d. at 863-64.
173. 17 T.C. 1097, ll04-05 (1952).
174.
Not only do we have here a system of accounting which for years has been adopted
and carried into effect by substantially all members of a large industry, but the system is
one which appeals to us as so much in line with plain common sense that we are at a
loss to understand what could have prompted the Commissioner to disapprove it. Contrary
to his suggestion that petitioner's method did not reflect its true income it seems to us
that the alterations demanded by the Commissioner would wholly distort that income.
219 F.2d at 869. See Stanger, Vander Kam, & Polifka, supra note 42, at 419-20. &e alw Hughes
Properties, Inc. v. United States, 760 F.2d 1292 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 522 (1985).
The taxpayer's method of accounting accurately reflects the casino's income and expenses.
If we were to require that the deduction of a jackpot liability be deferred until the year
of actual payment, rather than the year in which the liability accrued, it would distort
taxable income for the year of payment. Here, the accounting method used by the taxpayer
results in allocation of the expense to the year in which the revenues were earned.
!d. at 1293.
175. 230 F.2d 7'22 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'g 24 T.C. 247 (1955).
176. ld. at 723. Schuessler illustrates the sometimes fine line between the treatment of prepaid
income of an accrual-basis taxpayer, see supra note 44 and accompanying text, and the treatment
of estimated future expenses of such a taxpayer:
[I]f a taxpayer sells an article with a warranty of future repair service, it is possible to
say on the one hand that some portion of the net income to be derived from the transaction
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understandable why the Commissioner's attacks on premature
the clear reflection doctrine have been at best ~n'w"n'
missioner has been unduly timid. The history of the
has
not been so straightforward, and, on closer inspection,
lacks a coherent theoretical basis for tax purposes.
The deficiencies in the Anderson Court's reading of the
the purposes of accrual accounting and the matching principle were
detailed
by Gunn. 177 Accrual accounting for tax purposes originated not as an attempt
to measure "true income" but from "considerations of convenience": it was
easier for taxpayers to make tax returns on the basis on which they
their
books. 17n A review of tax accounting history demonstrates that, when administrative convenience would be served by a departure from the standards of
financial accounting, convenience has generally prevailed. For example, tax·
payers must include in income amounts received under a "claim of right" even
though, because of a dispute, all the events that have fixed· the right to the
income have not occurred. ' 79 Additionally, the tax law has never permitted the
deduction of contingent liabilities, although reflection in financial accounts is
often required by generally accepted accounting principles, including the matching principle. '" 0
The goals of financial and tax accounting do not coincide, and therefore
the case for incorporation of the matching principle into tax law is theoretically
suspect. As the Supreme Court recently explained in Thor Power Tool Co. v.
Commissioner, 181 "The primary goal of financial accounting is to provide useful
information to management, shareholders, creditors, and others properly interested; the major responsibility of the accountant is to protect these parties from
being misled." 1 ~ 2 If matching of income and expenses does not occur, potential

will be earned at the time the warranty is fulfilled (prepaid income) or, on the other hand,
that the entire net income to be derived from the transaction is attributable to the year
of the sale, but in computing this net income estimated future expenses properly attributable
to servicing the warranty should be deducted.
Schapiro, supra note 20, at 1134. "[Tjhe courts have recognized that since the underlying purpose
for deferring income and for accruing expenses is the same, i.e., the matching of revenues against
the expenses that produced the revenues, the two concepts should be governed by the same legal
principles." Stanger, Vander Kam, & Polifka, supra note 42, at 406. See, e.g., Commissioner v.
Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 367 U.S. 906 (1961) (remanding case involving accrued
future expenses for reconsideration in light of American Automobile Association); Villafranca v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d 849 (6th Cir.) (same principles apply in evaluating prepaid income and estimated future expenses), ccrt. denied, 385 U.S. 840 (1966); Simplified Tax Records, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 41 T.C. 75 (1963) (to same effect).
177. Gunn, supra note 11.
178. /d. at 4-6. The Court in Anderson had cited no authority in support of its understanding
of accrual accounting and the matching principle. In Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934),
the Court, when forced to choose between the all events test and the matching principle, deferred
to the all events test. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
179. Gunn, supra note 11, at 9. See supra note 44.
180. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
181. 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
182. ld. at 542. The Court stated that its "cases demonstrate that divergence between tax
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investors and creditors are given misleading views of the financial status of the
company. 183 Consequently, generally accepted accounting principles are conservative, tending to depress rather than inflate reported profits. In contrast,
the interests of the Commissioner in protecting the revenue and collecting taxes
equitably are not well-served by conservative principles. 184 With such a fundamental conflict in the purposes of the two accounting regimes, the Court in
Thor Power properly concluded that no presumptive equivalency exists between
the two. 185
The Supreme Court's repudiation of the proposition that financial accounting
concepts should necessarily govern tax issues has reached the lower courts.
Relying on Thor Power, the Second Circuit in RCA Corp. v. United States, 186 a
prepaid income case, expressly refused to follow the dictates of the matching
principle. 187
If the matching principle is "irrelevant" to tax accounting concerns, IHH a
"clear reflection of income" standard for tax purposes should be distinct from
matching. 189 By forgoing the opportunity to inject economic principles into the
analysis of the premature accrual cases, the Commissioner lost his opportunity
to participate in the redefinition of "clear reflection of income." 190
and financial accounting is especially common when a taxpayer seeks a current deduction for
estimated future expenses or losses." !d. at 541 (citing Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446
(1959) (reserve to cover contingent liability if guaranty not performed); Brown v. Helvering, 291
U.S. 193 (1934) (reserve to cover expected insurance commission refunds arising from cancelled
policies); and Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445 (1930) (reserve to cover expected liability
for contested lawsuit)).
183. See Gunn, supra note 11, at 12:
Financial accountants devise their rules to achieve matching because the failure to do so
would generate financial statements misleading to prospective investors and creditors ....
(The purposes of financial accounting] derive from the supposition that investors and creditors will use this year's "income" as an estimate of future performance . . . .
See also FINANCIAL AccouNTING STANDARDS BoARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AccouNTING CoNCEPTS
No. 3, at 41-43 (1980).
184. See RCA Corp. v. United States, 664 F.2d 881, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Thor Power
Tool Co.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133 (1982); Dubroff, Cahill, & Norris, Tax Accounting: TheRelationship of Clear Reflection of Income to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, 47 ALB. L. REv. 354,
378-79 (1983); Oberdorfer & Michelman, A Commentary on Tax Administration and Accrual Accounting,
12 AM. U.L. REv. 135, 140 (1963); Raby & Richter, Conformity qf Tax and Financial Accounting,
139 J. AccT. No. 3, March, 1975, at 42, 44 (arguing against conformity).
185. 439 U.S. at 543.
186. 664 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133 (1982).
187. 664 F.2d at 885. The court held that prepaid income could not be deferred even though
the taxpayer's method of accounting "matched . . . revenues and related expenses with reasonable
precision . . . . '' !d. The court left open the possibility that deferral of prepaid income would be
permitted in a case in which the services were to be performed on fixed dates and the taxpayer
could be sure of the profit to be earned from the services contract. /d. at 889. See supra note 114.
188. Gunn, supra note 11, at 19.
189. !d. at 34. Not all commentators agree that financial accounting principles should be
irrelevant: "(E]ven acknowledging the bias of financial accounting towards minimizing income,
reference to the financial accounting treatment of transactions may be appropriate in determining
what constitutes a clear reflection of [income]." New York City Bar Report, supra note 11, at 701
(footnotes omitted).
190. Gunn suggests that, rather than setting out general accounting guidelines, "clear rcflec-
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PREMATURE AccRUALS AFTER THE TAx REFORM AcT:

THE CoDIFICATION oF A PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENT

Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1984, the all events test was silent concerning
an economic performance requirement; nothing in the test specifically required
that a deduction for a future liability be deferred until activities were performed
that would satisfy the liability. The Internal Revenue Service generally argued
that such a requirement was implicit, 191 but the Commissioner received mixed
judicial support. 192 Furthermore, the Commissioner had effectively abandoned
an alternative argument that such deductions do "not clearly reflect income." 19'1
To end the confusion and to establish a relationship between deduction and
cost, the Tax Reform Act expressly included a performance requirement that
the taxpayer must meet before a liability may be deducted.
The original theoretical justification for the performance requirement is lost
in the mists of antiquity. Perhaps it had to do with administrative convenience
- permitting deduction at a relatively definite, predictable time - although
the rule of Ohio River Collieries Co., 194 for example, appears no less definite or
predictable. The motivation for the statutory change is clear, however. Congress
"[gradually realized] . . . a basic economic fact of life, well known to the
financial community: money has a time value as well as an exchange value. " 1""
The unmodified all events test had not taken the time value of money into
account, and the "clear reflection" principle had never been expressly applied
with that concept in mind. 196
There is no evidence that the time value of money influenced the CommissiOner and those courts which accepted an economic performance requirement prior to the Tax Reform Act. Certainly the rulings and cases did not
articulate the issues in that way. Since an economic theory could only have
strengthened the rulings, it is doubtful that such a rationale was consciously
suppressed. 197 Although economic theory played no explicit role in the case law

tion" authorizes a process:
Once an income or deduction item has been received, paid. or accrued, someone must
decide whether to give it tax effect at that time. Sensible decisions require asking questions
about administrative convenience and economics. The Commissionel:,'s power to determine
dear reflection of income is a power to ask - and answer - those questions.
Gunn, supra note II, at 34.
191. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 146-90 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
195. J. EusTICE, supra note i I, at 2-2. See also H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 5, at 1254;
joiNT CoMMITIEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 260-61; SENATE CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at
266.
196. See CoNFERENCE CoMMITIEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 871: "Neither the Internal Revenue
Code nor case law require[ d) a taxpayer to account for future expenses on a present value basis."
197. Moreover, the performance doctrine arose in a time of relatively low interest rates, when
the benefits of premature accruals were not as substantial as in recent years. The time value of
money is a much less compelling concern in times of little or no inflation. See J. EvsTJCE, supra
note l I, at 2-2 to -3.
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development of an economic performance standard, it is probable that economic
concerns played an implicit one. An obligation to be fulfilled in the distant
future may have met the technical requirements for deductibility, but something
must have seemed amiss.
This section discusses the new statutory scheme with its economic performance requirement, the exceptions to that requirement, the deficiencies in the
new statute, and the remaining scope of the old all events test. Finally, the
section considers the effect of the changes on the use of financial accounting
concepts in determining the timing of deductions.
A.

The Statutory Modification: Intmduction

The Tax Reform Act expressly incorporated an economic performance standard into the all events test. The all events test was made part of the Internal
Revenue Code 198 with the two components of the test taken, nearly verbatim,
from the Income Tax Regulations, ' 99 but in general the test is meeoo no earlier
than economic performance. 2t" To deduct a future liability, a taxpayer must
now be able to demonstrate not only the fact and the amount of the liability,
but also that economic performance has occurred. 202
Economic performance occurs as activities are performed that are necessary
to satisfy the liability. Where the liability is attributable to the taxpayer's obligation to provide or pay for property or services, economic performance takes
place only as the property or services are provided. 2m This principle generally

198. I.R.C. S 46l(h)(4), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98··369, 5 91(a),
98 Stat. at 599.
199. See supra text accompanying note 50. New § 46l(h)(4) (CCH 1985) reads: ''[T]he all
events test is met with respect to any item if all events have occurred which determine the fact
of liability and the amount of such liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy."
200. See infra notes 217-32 and accompanying text (exceptions to economic performance test).
201. I.R.C. S 46l(h)(l), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-369, § 9l(a),
98 Stat. at 598.
202. l.R.C. § 46l(h)(4), as adtkd by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 9l(a),
98 Stat. at 599. See infra notes 249·51 and accompanying text for a discussion of what remains of
the old all events test.
203. I.R.C. §§ 461(h)(2)(A)(i), 461(h)(2)(a)(ii), 46l(h)(2)(B), as added by Tax Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 91(a), 98 Stat. at 598-99. When the property or services are provided
over time, economic performance also occurs over time, and the allowable deduction must be
appropriately allocated. One commentator has suggested that the percentage of completion method
for allocating contract income among taxable years may provide guidance for the interpretation of
"economic performance" under § 461(h). Under that method, a taxpayer recognizes income under
a contract as he gives economic performance, Determination of the portion of the gross contract
price included in income in a taxable year is made by use of either the cost completion method
(comparing costs incurred to estimated total contract costs) or the physical completion method
(comparing work performed to estimated total work). Martin, Tax Shelter Accounting Under the New
Law: An Analysis of a Dramatically-Changed Area, 61 J. TAX'N 170, 170·71 (1984). See Treas. Reg.
§ l.451-3(c), T.D. 7397, 1976-1 C.B. 115, 117.
The Senate Finance Committee intended that regulations be issued to the effect that the time
at which property is provided may include the time of delivery, the time of shipment, or some
other time as long as the taxpayer is consistent from year to year. SENATE CoMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 267.
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to the Internal Revenue Service's
to pay
when
deduct the $100 no earlier
arises out of a tort or workers'
economic
takes place only as
payments are made to ''another person."2"7 This rule obviates the
economtc
that had been
associated with structured settlements.'1011 In a lease of property for use in a
economic
occurs as the taxpayer uses the property
the lease term. 209 Economic
with respect to interest
occurs as time passes - as the lender
use of, and the borrower
uses, the lender's funds - not as payments are made.'"" Thus, prepayments
of interest are not
deductible in the year made. 211
rent are
allocated to the period to which
other cases, the
of the Treasury must issue
determination of when economic
has occurred. ~u

204. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text. The rule may deviate from the historical
Internal Revenue Service position in one respect. Under the pre-Tax Reform Act all events test,
if a taxpayer had prepaid for property or services, and had not contested the liability, it appears
that the Commissioner would have pet·mitted a deduction in the year of the payment. See infra
note 2!19 and accompanying text.
The House Ways and Means Committee report specifically deals with the strip. mining situation:
[IJf a strip mining company engages a contractor to reclaim stripped land, economic per·
formance occurs when the contractor performs the reclamation rather than when the strip
company enters into a binding contract with the contractor. Likewise, when the
company itself reclaims the land, economic performance occurs when the land
H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 5, at 1255.
205. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
206. If, for some reason, the servic1ls were not performed until 199!, A would be required
to defer his deduction until that time, apparently without regard to whether or not the $100 was
paid in 1990. See irifra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §
207. I.R.C. §
91(a), 98 Stat. at 598-99.
208. In McGown's striking example of a structUJ:ed settlement, the $3 million future payment
would be deductible no earlier than the year made. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying
But see infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text (ambiguities affecting treatment of payments
pursuant to structured settlements).
209. LR.C. § 46l(h)(2)(A)(iii), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98·369, §
9l(a), 98 Stat. at 599.
210. CoNFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 875; JOINT CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 265.
211. See infra notes 239·42 and accompanying text. Treating economic performance as occurring
over time ties § 461 into the existing rules for deducting interest,
original issue discount.
An issuer of a discounted debt instrument may deduct the annual
of the original issue
discount, computed using compounding assumptions. See l.R.C. § l63(e), as amended kr Tax Refonn
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 42(a)(3), l28(c), 98 Stat. at 599.
212. CoNFERENC~£ CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 875; jOINT CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 264.
S 461(h)(2)(D), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub.
No. 98-369, §
213.
9l(a), 98 Stat. at 599. The new regulations may provide for deduction at a time determined by
existing regulations or rulings when the prior law is consistent with economic performance principles.
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The effect of the economic performance requirement is to base the amount
and timing of a deduction on the true cost of the liability. 214 Congress had
available two methods for achieving this result: allowing only the present
value of the future liability to be deducted or requiring deferral of the deduc·
tion. 215 Permitting a current discounted deduction would have resulted in extraordinary administrative burdens, both in drafting the implementing rules and
regulations and in administering those rules. The choice of the economic
performance standard was unquestionably made for reasons for certainty and
ease of administrative application. 216

B.

Exceptions To Economic Performance

The strict economic performance requirement does not apply in a number
of different situations. In some cases, prior law will control while, in others,
the Tax Reform Act created new statutory rules. The statute specifically exempts
those situations, such as additions to reserves for bad debts/ 17 which are covered
by other provisions of the Code.211l Deductibility will be governed by prior law,
with no economic performance requirement applied.
An additional statutory exception applies for a limited class of recurring

CoNFERENCE CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 876; ]DINT CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5,
at 265; SENATE CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 268. For example, the legislative history of
the Act indicates that economic performance for property taxes may be deemed to occur at the
time of assessment rather than at the time a lien attaches. SENATE CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note
5, at 268.
214. But see infra notes 233-42 and accompanying text (deviations from time value of money
concepts).
215. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. Taxpayers should generally have been indifferent between the two methods, assuming that the rates used for discounting could be properly
selected. See Abusive Tax Shelters, Hearings Before Senate Finance Subcommittee on Oversight of the Internal
Revenue Service of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings] (statement of Robert G. Woodward); Gunn, supra note 11, at 31 n.144. Discount rates,
however, cannot, by definition, take account of unexpected inflationary changes.
216. Hearings, supra note 215, at 87 (statement of Robert G. Woodward). See H. R. REP. No.
432, supra note 5, at 1254-55:
The committee recognizes that in the case of noncapital items, a taxpayer, theoretically,
should be allowed a deduction for either the full amount of a liability when the liability
is satisfied or a discounted amount at an earlier time. However, the committee also recognizes that determining the discounted values for all kinds of future expenses would be
extraordinarily complex and would be extremely difficult to administer. For instance, a
system that allowed current deductions for discounted future expenses would have to include
a complex set of rules for recalculating overstated and understated deductions when the
future liabilities are reestimated or are actually satisfied at a time, or in an amount, different
from that originally projected; a complex recapture mechanism would be required. . . .
Therefore, in order to prevent deductions for future expenses in excess of their true cost
while avoiding the complexity of a system of discounted valuation, the committee believes
that expenses should be accrued only when economic performance occurs.
See also ]oiNT CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 261.
217. l.R.C. § 166(c) (1982). But see 1985 REAGAN PROPOSALS, supra note 19, at 215-17 (rec·
ommending repeal of reserve method for bad debt deductions).
218. E.g., I.R.C. § 463 (CCH 1985) (relating to vacation pay); I.R.C. § 466 (1982) (relating
to discount coupons).
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items. In these instances the Act permits the accrual of a liability prior to the
year of economic performance. This exception was intended to "avoid disrupting
normal business and accounting practices" with respect to various routine business deductions when the economic benefit of a premature accrual is slight. 219
A liability will be considered incurred in a particular taxable year if four conditions are satisfied:
( 1) the all events test, applied without an economic performance requirement, is satisfied;
(2) economic performance in fact occurs within a reasonable period after
the close of the taxable year (and no later than 8-1/2 months after such
close);
(3) the item is recurring and the taxpayer's treatment is consistent from
year to year; and
( 4) either the item is not a material item or accrual in the taxable year
results in a "more proper" matching of expenses and income than
would accrual in a later year. 220
The exception will in no case apply to workers' compensation or tort liabilities. 221
The recurring item exception is not without ambiguities. For example, how
is a taxpayer, when filing a timely return, to determine whether economic
performance will in fact occur within 8-1/2 months after the end of the taxable
year? 222 Past experience may be helpful in the determination, yet Congress
intended the exception to be available to new businesses, for new types of
expenses, and for expenses that, though recurring, do not recur annually.m
These situations, by their nature, will not have a helpful history.
The Act also departs from a strict application of the economic performance
requirement for certain liabilities .incurred in activities that are considered socially important. For example, taxpayers may elect to use a "more liberal"
reserve method of accounting in the case of some strip mining reclamation and
solid waste disposal costs. 224 To qualify for the special treatment, costs must be
"qualified reclamation or closing costs." In general, such costs are those associated with obligations arising under federal or state laws. 225

219. CoNFERENCE CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 873. The exception for recurring items
did not appear in either the House or Senate versions of the bill. It was added in conference, and
it contains the ambiguities that last-minute additions often have.
220. I.R.C. § 461(h)(3)(A), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §
9l(a), 98 Stat. at 599.
221. I.R.C. S 461(h)(3)(C), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §
91(a), 98 Stat. at 600.
222. See Horvitz & Angelini, Restrictions of New Law on Accrual· and CashcBasis Tax Shelters, 2
J. TAX'N INVESTMENTS 285, 295-96 (1985).
223. jOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 263.
224. SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 274.
225. Specifically, the obligations must arise under permits granted pursuant to the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, or similar federal
or state laws. I.R.C. § 468(d)(2), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, S
91(b), 98 Stat. at 603-04. "Qualified reclamation costs" would therefore noi include reclamation
obligations arising from other mining or drilling activities, such as an obligation to restore land
once an oil pipeline has gone out of service. See generally Aidinoff & Lopata, supra note 3.
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The amount that may be deducted
reclamation
the taxable
or dosing costs attributable to .. .,.. 5 ""''''"'"''
year. 226 The estimate is made on the basis
the year of
Deductible amounts are added to
the estimate.
reserve and
statutory rate. "-'B
interest on the reserve is deemed to accrue
Amounts
for reclamation and
are subtracted from
the reserve. 229 No further deduction is available upon reclamation unless the
amount expended exceeds the
reserve
in which case the excess
is deductible in the year paid. 230 If the
balance exceeds current reda·
mation or
that excess is includable in taxable mcome.
scheme is created
the accrual of
and the recapture of excess reserves.
economic benefit of the current deductions is limited. The Act
rule of Ohio River Collieries Co., and the
mation costs was not 1ntended to preserve
since the excejptJ,on
serve as an
overstates the amount
of deductions
costs. A limited premature accrual
retained to further desirable social
u

..

ends. 23 ~

226. I.R.C. § 468(a)(l), as added h)' Tax Reform Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 98-369, S 9l(b),
98 Stat. at 60 L
227. I.R.C. § 468(d)(l), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 9l(b),
98 Stat. at 603.
228. LR.C. § 468{a)(2)(B), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 9!(b),
98 Stat. at 602. The rate is a specified percentage (70% for taxable years ending in 1984 or !985,
85% for !986, and 100% thereafter) of the "Federal short-term rate," compounded semiannually.
The Federal short-term rate is the average market yield during any six-month period on outstanding
obligations of the United States with maturities of three years or less. LR.C. §§ 468(a)(2)(B},
1274(d)(l)(D), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 4l(a), 9l(b), 98 Stat.
at 602.
229. LR.C. § 468(a)(2}(C), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §
9l(b), 98 Stat. at 602.
230. I.R.C. § 468(a)(3), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 91(b),
98 Stat. at 602.
231. I.R.C. § 4·68(a)(4), as added by Tax Reform Act of 19~4, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 9l(bJ,
98 Stat. at 602-03.
232. The interest rate used, for example (see supra note 228), would be inappropriately low if
the purpose were to adopt an accurate discount rate. The
administration has accordingly
proposed to curtail the usc of the reserve method in this area.
1985 REAGAN PROPOSALS, supra
note 19, at 220·21.
With another category of future liabilities, nuclear plant decommissioning expenses, the Act
established a different deduction mechanism, without the same incentive e!fect. The Act pennits
deductions before economic performance, but without lowering the taxes paid in present value
terms. jOINT CoMM!TfEE REPORT, sulJra note 5, at 270.
In general, a taxpayer may deduct contributions 10 a ''Nuclear Decommissioning Reserve Fu'ld,"
a segregated trust established by the taxpayer for the payment of decommissioning and other costs.
The fund is a separate taxable entity, taxed at the maximum corporate rate (4·6% ). LR.C. §
468A(c)(2), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 91(c). 98 Stat. at 605.
The taxpayer must obtain an advance ruling establishing the maximum annual contribution to the
fund, and the schedule of deductible amounts is subject to review by the Secretary of the Treasury.
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Statutory Dificiencies

The changes made by the Tax Reform Act are major improvements over
prior law. They g<;:nerally result in equalizing deductions for future liabilities
and the true costs of those liabiiities. However, inconsistencies with time value
of money concepts continue to exist, and the statute contains other shortcomings
arising from its ambiguous language.
1.

Deviations from Time Value of Money Principles

The deduction provisions of the Tax Reform Act deviate from time value
of money principles in two situations. The problem in both cases arises because
time of economic performance may differ from time of payment. In the first
case, the rules have not eliminated the possibility of premature accruals. In the
second, the rules operate to deny a deduction at the economically appropriate
time.
The deduction of an undiscounted liability overstates economic cost when
a substantial period separates accrual and payment. m After the Tax Reform Act
of 1984 a premature accrual is still possible if a lag time between economic
performance and payment exists and economic performance occurs first. For
example, if a taxpayer contracts for services to be performed in 1985, but is
not required to pay for the services until 1990, and if the contract specifies a
precise amount for the services, the taxpayer is entitled in 1985 to an undiscounted deduction for the future liability. Economic performance takes place in
1985, when the services are performed. The fact of the liability, established by
performance, and the amount of the liability, set by the contract, would be
demonstrable in that year as welL
The cost to the Treasury of the premature accrual would not necessarily
be offset by increased revenues from the provider of services. If the previder
is a cash-basis taxpayer, for example, income from the services would not be
reported until 1990, when payment is received. 214
How serious a problem is this potential for premature accruals? In most
cases, there will be no substantial lag between performance and payment. Nevertheless, the statute allows for imaginative tax planning similar to that suggested
for structured settlements under pre-Act law. m Providers and consumers of
I.R.C. § 468A(d), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984-, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 9l(c), 98 Stat.
at 605. The ruling is to insure that excess funds are not accumulated and that deductions will not
be more rapid than level funding. LR.C. 5 468A(dX2), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-369, § 9l(c), 98 Stat. at 605; joiNT CoMMitTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 270-71.
Contributions will be deductible in the year made, but only to the extent the amounts are added
to the taxpayer's cost of service for ratemaking purposes and charged to customers. I.R.C. S
468A(b), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98·369, S 9l(c), 98 Stat. at 604-05,
233. See Gunn, supra note 11, at 35; supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. But see !985 REAGAN, PROPOSALS, supra note 19,
at 213 (proposing to limit use of cash method). If the services-provider uses an accrual method,
he will have to recognize income no later than the year of economic performance. See supra note
84. But the Treasury may still be the loser if the two parties are not in the same marginal tax
bracket.
235. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
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services can structure contracts that divide the tax savings from a premature
accrual between the parties. In the above example, the consumer of services
will deduct the 1990 contract price in 1985, offsetting income in that year and
lowering his tax bill. The contract price should reflect an adequate return to
the provider of services, both for the services and for the delay in payment.
In addition, because he has facilitated the deferral arrangement, the services·
provider can insist that the contract price provide him with a share of the
consumer's benefit from the accelerated deduction. 2:16
As long as the enhanced contract price is reasonable, it should be defensible
against the Commissioner's challenge that it does not reflect market consider·
ations. The parties can argue the higher price exists to compensate the services·
provider for the risk of nonpayment. If the consumer is unable to pay in five
years, the services-provider would have to carry the loss.
This loophole in the economic performance test has been partially closed by
other provisions of the Code affecting high cost service contracts. As a result
of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, service contracts over $250,000 are subject to
imputed interest rules if payments for the services are to be made beyond the
close of the calendar year in which services are provided. This will limit the
benefit of premature accruals. 237 However, since deferred-payment service con·
tracts under $250,000 are immune from application of the imputed interest
rules, m the ability to structure transactions to benefit from premature accruals
remains great.
The second deviation from time value of money principles relates to pre·
payments of liabilities. The Tax Reform Act denies a deduction in the year of
payment to an accrual-basis taxpayer who prepays the costs of services or prop·
erty, even though the fact and the amount of the liability are demonstrable.
For example, under prior law, a strip mining company that contracted to have

236. The economics are not the same as with the tort settlement hypothetical, however, because
the compensation for services would not be excludible from income. See supra notes 34-40 and
accompanying text.
237. I.R.C. §§ 467(g), 467(d), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §
92(a), 98 Stat. at 611. When the imputed interest rules do apply, part of the contract "price"
for services will be recharacterized as interest. The amount treated as interest will be subject to
its own timing rules, with economic performance occurring with the passage of time. See supra notes
210·11 and accompanying text. If the imputed interest rate accurately reflects the market, the
contract amount remaining after the interest component has been broken out and separately treated
will be the true cost of the liability. Thus, even if a current deduction is permitted, the amount
of the deduction will be only the present value of the future payment.
For example, suppose a services contract provides for a $300,000 payment in 1990, but the
imputed interest rules require treating $50,000 of that amount as interest. Even if the economic
performance requirement is met in 1985 by the performance of services, only $250,000 would be
deductible in that year as a payment for services. The remaining $50,000 would be subject to the
interest accrual rules.
238. For property transfers, imputed interest rules were already in place prior to 1984, and
the Act extended their scope. See I.R.C. § 483, as am.eruied by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98·369, § 41(b), 98 Stat. at 553-55; I.R.C. §S 1271-1275, as added by Tax Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, S 41(a), 98 Stat. at 531-43. As with the rules affecting contracts for
services, however, not all transactions are subject to the imputed interest rules.
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statutorily required reclamation done in a future taxable year could have met
the all events test in the year of mining if the reasonable accuracy of the
obligation could have been established. 239 If, pursuant to the contract, the mining
company prepaid the cost of the reclamation in that year, even the Commissioner would have been satisfied with the deduction. The strip miner's payment
under the contract would have constituted performance.
The Tax Reform Act, however, treats economic performance as occurring
when the reclamation services are provided, not when payment is made. 240 If
it were not for the special protection afforded such strip mining obligations, 241
no deduction would be allowed prior to reclamation. Since other liabilities do
not have the benefit of a statutory exception, deductions for such liabilities must
await economic performance even if the liability is prepaid.
Disallowing a deduction in the year of prepayment is economically indefensible since the prepayment price presumably represents the parties' determination of the present value of the future obligation. Because the taxpayer
would deduct only the present value of the future cost, accrual abuse would
not result from a current deduction. Moreover, requiring deferral of the deduction until the later year understates the economic cost of the liability to the
taxpayer. 242 A deduction following performance of the services will be limited
to the amount of prepayment, the already discounted figure set by the parties.
This defect in the statute will not be a problem for many taxpayers. The
well-advised accrual-basis taxpayer will simply avoid all prepayments that result
in undesirable tax consequences. But the world includes taxpayers who are not
well advised. For their benefit and for theoretical consistency, the statute should
be amended.
Both of the deviations from time value of money principles are attributable
to the definition of "economic performance," and both can be cured by a
redefinition that ties economic performance to payment. So modified, the statute
would perfectly mesh a deduction and the true cost of a liability.
2.

Structured Settlements

The Tax R<;>:form Act cures many of the previously discussed problems concerning structured settlements. When a taxpayer agrees to make periodic payments to a tort victim, the amounts will be deductible only as made. 24 :J Thus,
the taxpayer will not gain the benefit of an economically excessive current
deduction.
But suppose, more realistically, that the taxpayer funds its obligation by
purchasing an annuity. The annuity will pay to the tort victim the same amounts

See supra notes 67-121 and accompanying text.
See Lovelace & Jackson, Impact of Tax RejMm Act of 1984 on DedtJ.t:tions for Prepaid Intangible
Drilling Costs, 33 OrL & GAs TAX Q. 212, 214-15 (1984).
241. See supra notes 224-32 and accompanying text.
242. This fact was recognized even in the pre-Tax Reform Act form of l.R.C. § 461(1), which
permitted a current decluction for contested liabilities that otherwise met the all events test if the
taxpayer had actually paid the liability. See supra note 59.
243. See supra notes. 207-08 and accompanying text.
239.
240.
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that would otherwise have come directly from the taxpayer. Can the taxpayer
deduct anything in the year the annuity is purchased, or must it wait until
the tort victim receives its annuity payments? Similarly, if the taxpayer makes
a payment to a third party, a "qualified assignee, " 244 who agrees to assume
the periodic payment liability, will a current deduction be permissible?
Theoretical and practical arguments support granting a taxpayer a current
deduction for the cost of an annuity or for the amount of any payment to a
qualified assignee. The cost in either case reflects the time value of money,
and no economically excessive deduction will result. In either situation, the
taxpayer will be irrevocably committed to the discharge of its obligation.
To be entitled to a deduction, the taxpayer must discharge his obligation
to the victim. The legislative history of the ~ct indicates that, if a taxpayer
makes a payment to a trust for the benefit of a tort victim in a contested
action, the payment does not satisfy the economic performance requirement.
The payment does not discharge the taxpayer's liability. 246 Even though the
case of a contested liability is distinguishable from an unqualified purchase or
assignment, concern exists that the purchase of some annuities and some qualified assignments could be subject to the same rule.
If the settlement agreement requires the purchase of the annuity, or the
payment to a qualified assignee, economic performance appears to occur when
required payment is made to "another person.'" 247 The purchase price or payment would thus be deductible at that time. If the purchase or payment is not
specifically required by the settlement, however, the statute does not clearly
permit the current deduction.
A statutory amendment is not necessary to remove the ambiguity; a clarifying regulation would be sufficient. A current deduction for the cost of the
annuity or for the amount of the payment is entirely consistent with the economic theory of the Tax Reform Act and with past congressional practice
concerning structured settlements. It is hardly plausible that Congress, which
has generally sought to further such settlements, intended to put an economic
roadblock in their way. 248
244,. See l.R.C. S 130 (1982). Section 130 generally excludes from the income of an assignee
the amount received for agreeing to a "qualified assignment" - that is, agreeing to make periodic
payments as damages on account of personal injury or sickness. The exclusion does not apply to
the extent that the amount received exceeds the cost of funding the liability, by purchase of an
annuity or otherwise.
245, See Letter from Richard E. May to Ronald A. Pearlman, Acting Assistant Secretary for
Tax Policy (Sept. 17, 1984), reprt'nted in 25 TAx NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 69 (Oct. !, 1984).
246.. S'ee CONFERENCE CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 876; Are Structured Settlements Still
Viable Under New Lo.w?, 61 J. TAx'N 208 (1984).
247. l.R.C. S 46l(h)(2)(C), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §
91(a), 98 Stat. at 599. See Letter from Richard E. May, supra note 245, at 69.
248. l.R.C. S 130, see supra note 244, was enacted and I.R.C. § l04(aX2), see supra note 36,
was amended by the Periodic Payment Settlement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2605
(1982), to "facilitate structured settlements by authorizing qualified assignments of periodic payment
liabilities under section 130 and by confirming the tax-free character of p.eriodic payments to
plaintiffs under section l04(a)(2)." Letter from Richard E. May, supra note 245, at 70. See generally
Cane, supra note 36.
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The Residual All Events Test

The Tax Reform Act retained the all events test even though the critical
determination for deductibility usually will be the time of economic performance.
Relatively little remains of the jurisprudence that developed with respect to
determining the fact and amount of a liability. The economic performance
requirement generally delays a deduction until there is little or no doubt about
either the fact or the amount of the liability.
Economic performance fixe~ the fact of a liability prior to the Tax Reform
Act to the satisfaction of all parties, including the Commissioner, and thus its
inclusion in the Code renders the first part of the all events test redundant.
The amount of a liability will also generally be reasonably certain, if not fixed,
at the time of economic performance.
Nonetheless, the test for deductibility is ndt solely economic performance.
Although the scope of the old all events test is reduced, it is not eliminated.
In a limited number of situations, a liability may not be deductible despite the
occurrence of economic performance. Consider, for example, a taxpayer for
whom services have been performed but who disputes the liability and refuses
to pay. Although economic performance is deemed to occur as the services are
provided, the contest negates the fact of the liability, and the all events test is
not met. 249 If the taxpayer refuses to pay the liability, the special Code provision
dealing with contested liabilities is not applicable. 250
The amount of a liability may also not be reasonably estimable despite
economic performance. Any contract price tied to external, unpredictable measures may be subject to the Commissioner's challenge under the all events test. 251
Consider a deferred·payment contract which provides for services in 1985 to
be paid in 1990. If the contract does not fix the price, but instead provides
for payment at the market price prevailing in 1990 for such services, the future
liability may not be reasonably estimable in 1985.
Although the old all events test continues to have a limited scope in determining the timing of deductions, the clear reflection standard is no longer
a serious factor. Prior to the Tax Reform Act, the Commissioner had effectively
abandoned use of section 446(b) in this area, even when a substantial period
separated accrual and payment. Now that the Internal Revenue Code includes
the economic performance requirement, it is doubtful that the Commissioner
will revive the clear reflection standard to attack the few remaining opportunities
for accrual abuse.
249. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 59. In this case, the result is the proper one: no deduction is permitted
prior to payment, and no premature accrual results.
251. The result will be different if the contract provides for a fixed amount adjusted for
inflation. If part of a liability was fixed in fact and the amount thereof could be determined with
reasonable accuracy, the regulations prior to the Tax Reform Act permitted the deduction of the
fixed part. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (CCH 1985). If economic performance has occurred, the
fixed part of a liability should remain deductible under the new law. Whether the part of a liability
attributable to inflation adjustments is "reasonably estimable" was not a settled question under
prior law (see New York City Bar Report, supra note 11, at 706), and the Act did not clarify the
iSSUe.
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Economic Performance and Financial Accounting Principles

With few exceptions, the Tax Reform Act did not attempt to conform to
financial accounting principles. The matching principle has all but disappeared
from tax accounting analysis. If the time of economic performance is the same
as the time that related revenue is generated, it is by chance and not by
design. 252 The problem of premature accruals was created by financial accounting concepts, and, to solve that problem, it was necessary to discard those
concepts. 253
Two of the exceptions to the economic performance requirement do, at first
glance, appear to resurrect financial accounting principles in a statute that
generally abandoned those principles. 254 The special provision for reclamation
and waste disposal costs, by permitting use of reserve accounting, preserves a
measure of matching, and the exception for recurring items includes a condition
directly dependent on financial accounting concepts. This latter exception applies
only if the item is not material or if a better matching of income and expenses
would occur with immediate deductibility. Materiality and matching are both
to be determined by reference to the standards of financial accounting. 255
The continued role of financial accounting is more apparent than real. Nothing in the legislative history indicates the rationale for the special exception for
reclamation and waste disposal costs was the matching principle. Matching in
this case is a side-effect of a scheme developed for incentive purposes.
The special exception for recurring items is at most a last gasp for financial
accounting principles. It was an afterthought in the legislative process, conceived
more for reasons of taxpayer convenience than principled deference to financial
accounting. Moreover, the exception does not seriously limit the general attack
of the Tax Reform Act on premature accruals.
Since the exception can apply

252. For example, the time of reclamation of strip mined land is not necessarily, or even
probably, the same time that mining income is generated from the land. But see supra notes 22432 and accompanying text (special rules that preserve matching for strip mining).
The time of removal of an oil-drilling platform or of an oil pipeline will necessarily follow the
time of income generation. See Rev. Rul. 80-182, 1980-2 G.B. 167 (denying current deduction for
future platform removal obligation); supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. See also Aidinoff &
Lopata, supra note :5, who use the statutory obligation to restore land after an oil pipeline has
ended its operations as the "base case" for their analysis.
253. "The Deficit Reduction Act . . . contains a host of provisions that dramatically alter
well-established tax acc;ounting rul~s." Nesi, Tax Accounting Under the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,
15 TAx ADVISER 653, 653 (1984).
254. See Gunn, supra note 11, at 36 (premature accrual rules "seem to be based rather loosely
on matching").
255. CoNFERENCE CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8; at 873-75; Joint Committee Report, supra
note 5, at 263. Financial accounting principles will not necessarily be dispositive, however. In some
cases, items that are not considered material for financial reporting, for example, because of the
use of consolidated financial statements, may nonetheless be considered material under the exception
for recurring items. CoNFERENCE CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 874; JoiNT CoMMITIEE
REPORT, supra note 5, at 263.
256. See Sacco & Goldberg, Differences in Timing of Financial and Tax Deductions Widened by Deficit
Reduction Act, 34 TAX'N FOR AccTs. 218, 222 (1985): "The section [461(h)] makes dear that the
concept of matching costs and revenues .is not to be used except in very limited circumstances."
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only if economic perfonnance takes place within 8-112 months of the dose of
the taxable year, any premature accrual effect is minimal.
V.

CoNCLUSION

The Tax Reform Act is the first attempt to introduce economic rationality
into determining the timing and amount of deductions for accrual-basis taxpayers. The statute is not perfect; some deficiencies remain. Those deficiencies
are easily correctable, however, and the overall effect of the Act is worthy of
praise. It remains for Congress, or in some cases the Treasury Department,
to take the next step.
Amendments and Treasury regulations should be made with the same understanding that Congress generally displayed in the Tax Reform Act: it is the
principles of economics, and not those of financial accounting, that should govern the deduction of future liabilities by accrual-basis taxpayers.

